учебный год 2023 / Politics and precedent

Politics and Precedent: Wolsey's Parliament of 1523 Author(s): Robert L. Woods, Jr.

Source: The Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Aug., 1977), pp. 297-312 Published by: University of California Press

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PoliticsandPrecedent:

Parliamentof 1523

Wolsey's

By ROBERTL. WOODS,JR.*

THEPARLIAMENTof1523has often attracted the comments of historians.

Sitting during the middle of Cardinal Wolsey's preeminent power, it diminished the government's supply bill and criticized its conduct of foreign policy. Further, through the Commons' speakerit petitioned and received from the king the privilege of unlimited debate. Such actions have given it constitutional significance as well as political importance. This Parliament, then, stands at the crossroadsof Tudor constitutional

development and Tudor political administration.

However, these aspects of the 1523 Parliament have always been studied independently. Sir John Neale's famous essay tracing the history of freedom of speech in Parliament under the Tudors cites the signifi- cance of the speaker'spetition and concludes "it probable that [the speak- er] himself originated the claim [which] his successorsmay all thereafter have repeated."' Professor Elton's work on Tudor administration and politics explains the Commons' reluctance to grant supply and its criticism of the foreign policy as "Wolsey'sham-handedtreatment of the 1523 Parliament."8But here questions arise. If "Wolsey had looked after the administration because he wanted control and freedom to put his ideas

into practice in the courts and foreign policy,"3 and "Wolsey was a man of great mental powers,enormous application and assiduity in business, a wide grasp and firm intentions,"4 how did he lose the control upon which he based his ministry and power?Why would the chancellor abrogate his powersof explicit coercion?If Wolsey's primaryconcern was the funding of bellicose foreign policy, why did he meekly accept the smaller subsidy in August rather than the high subsidy passed by Commons be- fore he prorogued them in May?And finally, if the reluctance of the 1523 Parliament to grant funds to pursue a bellicose foreign policy was di- rectly attributable to Thomas Wolsey's arrogance, why did the cardinal

i"The Commons' Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament," in Tudor Studies Presented ...

to Albert Frederick Pollard, ed. R. W. Seton-Watson (London, 1924), pp. 257-286, esp. pp. 268-269.

2G. R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution (Cambridge, Eng., 1968), p. 286.

3G. R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government (Cambridge, Eng., 1966), p. 71. 4G. R. Elton, England under the Tudors (London, 1962), p. 88.

*I want to thank Professor A. J. Slavin and Professor J. H. Gleason for their patient criticism and encouragement with this paper.

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not suffer politically as a result? Answers to these questions are basic to

an understanding of early Tudor government and politics, especially to

Thomas Wolsey's monopoly of power between 1515 and 1528.

This paper examines the 1523 Parliament and proposes answers. It proceeds from the premise that Parliament was a political body, and

hence susceptible to political answering the questions, the paper suggests a "style of governance" consistent with Wolsey's unquestioned dominance. By examining the evidence concerning the 1523 Parliament, I conclude that Wolsey did not lose control of Parliament; rather he manipulated it to his own ends-to the fiscal doom and harsh criticism of a bellicose foreign policy which was not his. To effect this, Wolsey gave Commons a free rein of debate without fear of recrimination. When the Commons assented to a subsidy which could meet the financial demands of policy, he prorogued Parliament without permitting the Commons' bill to be introduced in the upper house. And finally, Wolsey did not suffer because of his handling of Parliament; he suc- ceeded in discrediting his rivals and the policies they proposed against his advice. In short, Thomas Wolsey's tenure as first minister displayed an acute awarenessof political realities. Born with none of the traditional qualities for regal counsel, Wolsey defended his position against power- ful rivals by manipulation of the medieval constitution. Wolsey, indeed, was the "last medieval chancellor" who "contented himself with admin-

istering the country as he found it."5He administered it actively.

The 1523 Parliament sat in three sessions over four months and en-

rolled thirty-fiveacts. The historical catechism of that Parliament holds that it existed solely to grant money. Parliament, it is claimed, was called to provide funds for fulfillment of the offensive alliance concluded in the

spring of 1521 with Charles V. The expeditions of 1522 drained the treasury, and no inherited treasure existed to spend. Wolsey, eager to

increase England's foreign reputation, attempted to manipulate that body for the monies, from its summons to its dissolution. But he de-

manded too much in a tax of twenty percent on all goods and lands. Parliament, aware of the power it held, withdrew from granting any funds until other business was enacted. Then, reluctant as ever, it expressed its dismay at the course of foreign policy through a critical paper by Thomas Cromwell, and passeda four-year,graduated subsidy at a lower rate. The cardinal, fearful of renewed criticism and cognizant of Parliament's immovability, promptly dissolved it.

Such an interpretation turnson two assumptions:that Wolsey espoused the foreign policy calling for invasion of France, and that Wolsey's con-

5Elton, Tudor Revolution, pp. 70-71.

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WOLSEY'S PARLIAMENT OF 1523

trol was insufficientto influence Parliament to his ends. I will investigate each of these assumptionsin turn.

The broad lines of English foreign policy during the 1520'sare, as yet, inconclusively drawn. Recent work, particularlyby Dr. Scarisbrick,gives ample cause to believe that Wolsey guided foreign policy with a single purpose, peace.6 Perhaps the reason was as practical as Scarisbricksug- gests,or perhapsit was more "European,"as Elton notes.7Whether motivated by ideology, thrift, or balance of power, Wolsey's reluctance for

war in 1522 and 1523 escaped few contemporaries.

By 1522, England found herself enmeshed in a series of treaties. In order to forestall compliance with Emperor CharlesV's requestsfor Eng-

lish assistance,Wolsey first lent money and then made English coopera- tion with the empire contingent on repayment of the loans.8 Although the Albany scareof Scottish invasion had required a diplomatic and militaryisolation of France,Scotland'sprimaryally, Wolsey did not push for war. But by May 1522, Anglo-French relations had so deteriorated that waroccurred.The total English effortconsisted of an expeditionary force under Thomas Howard, earl of Surrey.The force held no territory and merely ravagedBrittany and Normandy. No benefits accrued to England as a result of the forays; no serious disabilities to France. By October, when Surreyled the force back to Calais and then embarkedfor England, only the inhabitants of the battle areashad suffered.

But to Wolsey, England too had suffered. The aimless rapine in Brittany cost over ? oo,ooo.9 Further, it diminished England's effectiveness as mediator for Europe, by placing her ever more strongly with the Empire in the popular mind. England could gain little through war with France, either renewed in 1522 or projected in the Anglo-imperial in-

vasion, the "GreatEnterprise."As Elton summarized, "in 1522 England stood committed to a war in which her interests were not involved, while

her ally intended to use her for his own concerns only."loYet scarcelysix months later Parliament convened, supposedly for the purpose of granting monies to further another continental war against France. Sometime between October 1522 and the decision to call Parliament, the govern- ment of England disregardedthe principle of self-interest and seemingly

6J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (London, 1968), passim. 7Ibid., p. 49; Elton, England under the Tudors, pp. 88-97.

8These loans are calendared in Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII, ed. J. S. Brewer [hereafter LbP] (London, 1852-), passim, as is the treaty in L&P, III, No. 2332.

9This is an estimated figure; see L&P, III, Nos. 2013, 2745. loElton, England under the Tudors, p. 93.

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reaffirmedits commitment to war. We must now turn to the mechanics of the decision to summon Parliament.

As late in autumn as October 31, Charles V communicated to his am-

bassadorsin England his anxiety at Wolsey's reticence for war. "Youhave

twice written," the emperor noted, "that Wolsey seemed to be cooling toward the war and inclined to peace or a truce."ll The only thing unusual about Charles's intelligence was its late hour. Since the previous summer, Wolsey had planted doubts of the emperor's loyalty in Henry VIII's mind.12 Further, he ordered the king'sacting secretary,SirThomas More, to keep him posted on any change in the king's resolve for war.3l Thomas Wolsey acted through 1522 to forestall any belligerence on

England'spart,whether promised or projected. His reasoningwas simple. Diplomatically, England could receive no benefits. Domestically, the harvest season in the years 1520 and 1521 produced shortage, driving prices to record highs.l4Disorder seethed in the countryside, reacting to the larger proportion of disposable income necessaryfor subsistence and the imposition of a forced loan which further depressed disposable income. The preamble to the call for the 1522 loan italicized the expense of a foreign war, stating the need for money "for the defence of this realme and maintenaunce of our warresagainste Fraunce and Scotland."'5Wol- sey was not unaware either of the dearth of grains or the threat to order posed by the loan.16By January 1523, Wolsey unequivocally supported peace, because "such a truce once had, God may inspire in the minds of Christian princes to condescend into a further peace."'7But in January, Wolsey only reiterated his position againstrenewedwaron the Continent. The decision and the writs for a new Parliament to meet at Blackfriars'

Hall were alreadycirculating the realm.

Evidence for the decision to call Parliament fortunately exists in a report sent to Charles V by the imperial ambassadorson November 6,

1522.'8 Superficiallyit supports the notion that Wolsey remained firmly committed to the Anglo-imperial treaties calling for joint invasion of

France. But it also demonstratesWolsey's wile: The ambassadorsrestate

"Calendar of Letters ... Relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain ...

Further Supplement, ed. Garrett Mattingly [CSP, Span., F.S.], p. 160.

l2State Papers during the Reign of Henry the Eighth (London, 1830-52), I, 101-104. isIbid., p. I lo.

14The Agrarian History of England and Wales, IV: 1500-1640, ed. J. Thirsk (Cambridge, Eng., 1967), p. 817; Edward Hall, Henry VIII (London, 1904 [1550 edn.]), I, 240.

'sBritish Museum [B.M.], Cottonian MS., Cleopatra F, VI, fols. 315a-32oa; B.M., Stowe MS. 146, fol. 135a.

i6Corporation of London Record Office, Letter Book N, fol. 215a. '7State Papers, VI, 117.

'8CSP, Span., F.S., pp. 162-164.

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even if they did not, their presence so close to the king argues the numeri-

with its attendant fairs and markets.

2lHuntington Library, Ellesmere MS. 2655, fol. 17b.

301

more persons as present than had been at any meeting for two years, and

held to a position which was pro-imperial and anti-French; he reaffirmed

servant and took the lead from his monarch in matters of policy. An overt

though little remains of Abbot Islip's views, Polydore Vergil leaves no

22Cf. A. F. Pollard, Wolsey (London, 1965), p. 70, n. 3. For his preferments see LeNeve, Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae (London, 1963-67), passim.

2sL&P, II, No. 2270; L&P, IV, No. 1211; Pollard, Wolsey, p. 221.

24See M. Bowker, The Secular Clergy in the Diocese of Lincoln, 1495-1520 1968), pp. 8-9 and passim.

25D. D. Knowles, The Religious Orders in England, III: The Tudor Age (Cambridge, Eng., 1971), PP. 54, 63.

26The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil, ed. Denys Hay (London, 1950), p. 258.

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WOLSEY'S PARLIAMENT OF 1523

strong support for overt belligerency with France.27Further, since 1512 the Howards had struggled against Wolsey's power. The Howard attack on the chancellor included even the court poet, John Skelton.28Charles

Brandon, duke of Suffolk, was the king's brother-in-lawand boon com- panion. From 1521on, Henry had him almost constantly at his side. Even when Wolsey feared the influence of the duke, he could not pry the king from his friend.29Suffolkfollowed the king and loudly echoed the king's dreams.Worcester,saysPollard, gained his influence through his bastard blood.3sNevertheless, he held vast lands and exercised sufficient ability

as a military commander that Wolsey acknowledged it.s3But Worcester, like the marquisof Dorset, was in the Howard orbit from an early date.32 Certainly, Worcester inclined to war, which not only elevated him to his earldom in 1514 but also made him commander of the Knights of the Garterin 1523.It is interesting to note that Worcester and Tunstall were attestors to the Treaty of Windsor, which promised the "Great Enter- prise" with Charles V against France.33Dorset's strength rested in war- fare. He acquitted himself admirably in 1512-1513 against the French, and he was to do so again against the Scots in 1523. But Dorset held a grudge against the cardinal. A companion of the king who jousted his way to counsel, he was nominated by Henry to command the 1522 expe- dition; Wolsey vetoed the appointment. There is reason to believe that Wolsey also forced his removal from the privychamberbetween 1516and

1520.34

For the most part the commoners of the council show specialized knowledge rather than policy wisdom. Prior Thomas Dowcras5probably attended in order to contribute his insights into the emperor'splans. He, like Sir Richard Wingfield, spent the major part of 1521 abroad. Wing-

Cromwell) from the Dorset household, Wolsey's loyalties to the family lapsed with the death of Thomas Grey, the first marquis. Thomas II was one of Henry VIII's gay courtiers. After 1501, the Dorsets could provide little explicit aid to the rising chaplain; see S. B. Chrimes,

Henry VII (London, 1972), p. 292, n. i; A. J. Slavin, Politics and Profit: A Study of Sir Ralph Sadler, I507-1547 (Cambridge, Eng., 1966), p. iooff.

ssThe prior of the Hospitallers held parliamentary summons to the upper house, with the rank of temporal baron.

303

justice of King's Bench in 1495, he served both Henry VII and Henry VIII until his death. Sir David Owen was also a loyal servant of Henry

36J.Anstis, Register of the Garter (London, 1724), II, 232. 37DNB article, s.v. "Wingfield, Sir Richard (1469?-1525)."

38A. I. Dasent, The Speakers of the House of Commons (London, 1911), p. 119.

ssThe others alive were Sir Thomas Lovell and Sir Robert Drury, speakers of the 1485 and 1495 Parliaments respectively.

4oState Papers, I, 92.

4lAnglica Historia, pp. 52, 94; S. B. Chrimes, Henry VII (London, 1972) Statutes of the Realm, III, 60 (4 Henry VIII, c. 13).

42Calendar of State Papers ... Venice [CSP, Ven.], ed. Rawdon Brown, II, No. 750.

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WOLSEY'S PARLIAMENT OF 1523

retained the important posts of master of wards and treasurer of the household, he found himself farther from the centers of power, which rested in Wolsey's hands. In November 1522, Lovell attended council to

add his experience in having managed the 1485 Parliament. Lovell was an old man in 1522, with less than a year to live. He, like David Owen, would follow only one lead, that of his king.

The council which met in November 1522,then, displayed a particular bias. Certain men held to a position for war with France and to the

strengthening of the alliance with the emperor. Others simply looked for a chance to defeat the cardinal. These two groups united under the lead-

ership of the earl of Surrey, whose credentials in both camps went unquestioned. A few leaned to support of the chancellor. Like Thomas

More, they probably saw the possibility of domestic disorder and the futility of renewed war. Finally, a middle group looked to the king to

make a decision. Normally, Henry passively accepted the judgments of his chief minister, and they accordingly acceded. But in November 1522

Henry made known his desires, and the middle group was lost to the cardinal.

Henry's cyclic vainglory fed his commitment for war with France in 1522.In his quest for titles (the latest, in 1521,of "Defenderof the Faith" apparently only whetted his appetite), Henry dreamed of a Tudor off-

spring ruling the Hapsburg dominions. Indeed, through 1522, Charles V dangled the carrot of a marriage alliance with the English royal house before Henry's eyes. By November, Charles clearly implied that his con- sideration of the marriage with England, over a Portuguese union, de-

pended on England's commitment to the "Great Enterprise."43Perhaps Henry's dream was the need to provide for the succession, but since 1521

marriagebetween the Princess Maryand the emperor occupied much of the king's mind.44The 1522 treatycontained, in addition to the marriage terms, the promise of joint action by the Empire and England against

1523.45 England's fulfillment of the Treaty of Windsor could hasten the change from betrothed to married. Henry's dreamsconcerned

not only his posterity, but himself. From his succession, the king hoped for the recovery of French territory; he even dared to claim anew the

French crown. This anachronistic vainglory pursued Henry and found expression in the French campaigns of 1512, 1522, 1523, and the aborted one of 1525. Henry even promised in 1512, 1523, and 1525 to lead an

43L&P,III, No. 2663.

44R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485-1558 (New York, 1966), pp. 98ff.

45The Treaty of Windsor, L&P, III, No. 2332.

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