!!Экзамен зачет 2023 год / Unified theory of tort law

(Cite as: 43 Brandeis L.J. 369)

[FN230]. Jeffrey O'Connell & C. Brian Kelly, The Blame Game 128 (1987).

[FN231]. Jeffrey O'Connell & James F. Neale, HMO's, Cost Containment, and Early Offers: New Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 287, 307-08 (1998).

[FN232]. See, e.g., David M. Harney, Medical Malpractice 419-27 (2d ed. 1987) (arguing proof of causation in malpractice cases is difficult and because of the complex nature of medicine, the quantum of proof required should be lower in medical malpractice cases than in other ordinary personal injury actions).

[FN233]. See, e.g., Mancuso v. Neckles, 747 A.2d 255 (N.J. 2000) (noting that medical malpractice claims involving complex issues of causation differ from ordinary torts in which the cause of injury is apparent and stating that complex issues of causation are typical of medical malpractice cases).

[FN234]. Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice, Tort, Contract, and Managed Care, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 885, 895.

[FN235]. Schwartz, supra note 219, at 1071.

[FN236]. Id.

[FN237]. Dewees et al., supra note 7, at 425.

[FN238]. Id.

[FN239]. Schwartz, supra note 234, at 895.

[FN240]. See David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 1643, 1652 (2000) ("Heuristics may play a salvaging role. HMPS investigators were surprised to discover that, despite the manifest inaccuracies in general claiming behavior, the malpractice claiming system did appear to command the attention of physicians. Many believed that there was a high probability that they would be sued if they negligently injured one of their patients.").

[FN241]. Schwartz, supra note 219, at 1070.

[FN242]. Leonard J. Nelson, III, Helling v. Carey Revisited: Physician Liability in the Age of Managed Care, 25 Seattle L. Rev. 775, 784 (2002).

[FN243]. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 457, 481 (1994).

[FN244]. See Neil Vidmar, What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1205, 1222 (1994).

[FN245]. Nelson, supra note 242, at 787 ("Tort law has traditionally provided remedies for iatrogenic injuries due to negligent medical care under a custom-based standard of care.").

[FN246]. See Dewees et al., supra note 7, at 98 (stating negligence is decided "in terms of the standards of practice customary in the profession as a whole.").

[FN247]. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 185 (5th ed. 1998).

[FN248]. Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 87, 110. Accord Schwartz, supra note 234, at 887 (discussing custom in a section about the "relationship between tort and contract.").

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(Cite as: 43 Brandeis L.J. 369)

[FN249]. Schwartz, supra note 234, at 887.

[FN250]. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) (quoting Wanzler et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 New Eng. J. Med. 955, 997 (1984)):

There are three basic prerequisites for informed consent: the patient must have the capacity to reason and make judgments, the decision must be made voluntarily and without coercion, and the patient must have a clear understandingof the nature of the disease and the prognosis.

[FN251]. Comment, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance: A First Party No-Fault Insurance Proposal for Resolving the Medical Malpractice Insurance Controversy, 20 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 1245, 1281 n.163 (1987) ("Because the harm is not in the bad outcome, but in the failure to properly obtain the patient's consent, the outcome is logically irrelevant to liability.").

[FN252]. Schwartz, supra note 202, at 401 n.120.

[FN253]. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.

[FN254]. See, e.g., P. C. Williams, Abandoning Medical Malpractice, 5 J. Legal Med. 549, 570-73 (1984) (blaming the high rate of medical negligence in part on the custom standard which, he alleged, protects fellow doctors from liability).

[FN255]. Dewees et al., supra note 7, at 98 n.34 (discussing Helling v. Carey, supra note 222).

[FN256]. Deborah R. Hensler et al., Trends in Tort Litigation (RAND 1987).

[FN257]. Id. at 2.

[FN258]. Id. at 2-3.

[FN259]. Id. at 2.

[FN260]. Id. at 3.

[FN261]. See Id. at 11, 24 and 30.

[FN262]. See Hensler supra note 256, at 30.

[FN263]. Id. at 31.

[FN264]. Id.

[FN265]. Id. at 31, 32.

[FN266]. Id. at 25-29. Transaction costs are the costs associated with the litigation. In this case, the authors included plaintiffs' and defendants' legal fees, expenses and time, as well as claims processing and court expenditures. Id. at 27. Plaintiffs recover fifty-two percent of the total costs in net compensation.

[FN267]. Id. at 30.

[FN268]. See Hensler supra note 256, at 31-32.

[FN269]. Id.

[FN270]. Id.

[FN271]. Id. at 33.

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(Cite as: 43 Brandeis L.J. 369)

[FN272]. Id. at 25-29. Transaction costs are higher because of the greater complexity of the issues. Plaintiffs recover forty-three percent of total costs in net compensation.

[FN273]. Id. at 30.

[FN274]. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.

[FN275]. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.

[FN276]. Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 661, 663 (1997).

[FN277]. Hasnas, supra note 55, at 562.

[FN278]. John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 Geo. L. J. 513, 580 (2003).

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