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change. Inspired by Hegel, young Heidegger pointed to the concept of correlation between eternity and time as the major philosophical concept and task1. It meant that from that point onwards, according to Heidegger, all the efforts to understand eternity are also in vain if the notion of eternity goes beyond the boundaries of time and historical process. From a philosophical perspective, eternity is only in time, having left for itself no place whatsoever beyond time. Such a point of view caused a scandal among the Catholic social strata and even temporarily disrupted

Heidegger‘s academic career.

The fact that Heidegger became part of the already mentioned “apocalypse of reality” is not noteworthy: thousands of other European intellectuals of his time did so too. However, Heidegger had a specific reason for this turn: just like many others did, Heidegger brought time into the centre of his philosophy, yet with the help of texts by Husserl and Dilthey, he grasped what no one else could see in the phenomenon of temporality and what would eventually form the great thinker Heidegger that we know of today. He called the concept that he grasped Faktizität

– facticity.

In spite of important references left by Heidegger himself, especially in Being and Time2, the meaning of the concept of facticity was generally understood by those researching his philosophy only in the eighties, i.e. when texts written at the beginning of 1920s, consisting mainly of lectures of that time, were published in the edition of his collected works (Gesamtausgabe). Let us consider how this notion emerges in the texts of Heidegger, what the meaning of it is and what influence it had for the further development of his philosophy.

The concept of facticity was first mentioned by Heidegger in the lectures The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview3 that he gave in spring 1919. There Heidegger talked about hermeneutics of facticity. In his work Being and Time he pointed out the notion of facticity as the prototype of Dasein, while in

1927 letter to Karl Löwith, he would also reveal the prehistory that led to the emergence of the concept of facticity: habilitation thesis about Duns Scotus prepared in 1915 was “the most probable efforts at the time to comprehend what is facticible, to raise facticity as an issue”4. Duns Scotus’ concept of haecceitas, the analysis of which led Heidegger to the foundation of time and existence moments (existentiam et tempus, where for the first time we hear being and time, Sein und Zeit connotation’s shades) provided support for the Heideggerian concept of

1Heidegger M. Die Kategorienund Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus / Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. T. 1. Frankfurt, 1978. p. 189-411.

2Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen, 1976. C. 72.

3Heidegger M. Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungs Problem / Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. T. 56-57. Frankfurt, 1987.

4Papenfuss D., Pöggeler O. Im Gespräch der Zeit. T. 2. Francfurt, 1990. p. 33-38.

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facticity because it expressed the feeling of life’s concreteness: Duns Scotus “more than previous scholars before him (...) was able to find broad and subtle proximity (haecceitas) for what a real life is; its plurality and its tension”1. Famous geneticist of Heidegger’s texts Theodore Kisiel draws our attention to the fact that in the thesis about Duns Scotus quite a lot of attention is given to the analysis of medieval concepts simplex apprehensio and intellectus principiorum2. The aim of this analysis is to show that reality hides reflexive categories within itself; thus reality is hermeneutic from within and not because of throwing something that comes from human reason over its exterior. To put it differently, already in 1915 Heidegger grasped what in four years time would crystallize into the concept of becoming of reality’s concreteness (haecceitas, existentiam et tempus), which is characterized by existential structure and which he would call hermeneutics of facticity in 1919. In 1919 this hermeneutics of facticity, i.e. reality in its concreteness and inseparable from that concreteness operation of human reasoning, were also named by Heidegger as equally important and interchangeable concepts of factical life and factical thought. Hermeneutics of facticity, factical life and factical thought: these essentially equivalent phrases would crystallize into the concept of Dasein in a few years. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that the word sein (to be, being) is completely excluded from the works of Heidegger and is replaced by the notion of facticity and it will not come back to his works until 1923, in the cycle of lectures

Ontology (The Hermeneutics of Facticity)3. This can be explained by the fact that Heidegger tried to avoid by all means the projection of traditional notion of being into this newly developed concept of “factical life”. When the latter will be expressed fully, the notion of being will come back to the works of Heidegger and, transformed by the notion of facticity, it will become the most important axis of his philosophy. This data is particularly important to anyone who wants to perform the genesis of the notion of Heideggerian being.

It is also noteworthy that the notion of facticity that replaced the notion of being in 1919 is conveyed through the expression es gibt in the works of Heidegger. All the researchers of Heideggerian philosophy know how important the notion of es gibt is for his philosophy from 1927 up until his death. Moreover, the notion of facticity that was first used in the 1919 cycle of lectures The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview is also expressed in the same texts

1 Heidegger M. Die Kategorienund Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus / Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. T. 1. Frankfurt, 1978. p. 246.

2Kisiel Theodore. L‘indication formelle de la facticité: sa genèse et sa transformation. Heidegger 1919-1929 : de l’herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein. Paris, 1996. p. 206207.

3 Heidegger M. Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) / Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. T. 63. Frankfurt, 1988.

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through another emblematic notion of Heidegger: Er-eignis. However, having been referred to several times in the abovementioned lectures, the notion of Er-eignis will be temporarily forgotten. Yet we all know with what power it will come back to the texts of Heidegger from 1935 onwards. Undoubtedly, in 1919 the notions of es gibt and Er-eignis when used to refer to facticity did not yet have the meaning that they will obtain fifteen years later. Yet the fact that Heidegger started to use the notions once related to facticity again undoubtedly means that their meaning can be comprehended only if we understand that their roots lie in what the thinker called faktizität in 19191.

What does the notion of facticity mean in the philosophy of Heidegger? The word faktizität was coined by Fichte but also used by Husserl. As pointed out by Giorgio Agamben2, the meaning of this Heideggerian notion can be found in the quote by St. Augustine facticia est anima: the soul is being created, “made” by God every single moment. St. Augustine draws a contrast between two processes of coming into being facticius and nativus, and it is crucial to differentiate the two in order to grasp the meaning of Heidegger’s notion of facticity. Nativus refers to a naturally preconditioned birth to which laws of nature apply. Facticius, on the contrary, means direct and continuous interference of God into the process of the creation of one’s soul. Soul comes into being from God, with no predetermined rules, as no predetermined rules apply to God. According to St. Augustine, a human being is not only born – nativus – but is also being created at every single moment from a nothing – facticius. However, what is of interest for us here is that Heidegger not only adopts Augustinian facticius but also transforms it. How does this transformation occur? Heidegger breaks any links that the continuous process of coming into being had with Augustinian transcendence or the institution of God. According to Heidegger, facticity is the energy that renews itself every instant, that never stops, that arises from itself and within itself and that is free from any terms and conditions that would be imposed on it. We need to pay a special attention here as this is the moment when particularly important element of Heidegger’s philosophy emerges: the process of coming into being, dissociated from any theological notion of creation. The facticius of St. Augustine is both adopted and radically rejected here.

Having rejected theological origins of the process of facticity, i.e. theological origins of reality (the world), Heidegger analyses this process on the basis of

Augustinian categories and calls St. Augustine the first “heremeneutic of facticity” in Europe (“die erste ‚Hermeneutique‘ grossen Stils”)3. What is facticity, the

1Greisch J. L’Arbre de Vie et l’Arbre du savoir. Paris, 2000.

2Agamben G. La passion de la facticité. Questions ouvertes. Heidegger. Paris, 1988, p. 63-84.

3 Heidegger M. Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) / Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. T. 63. Frankfurt, 1988. p. 12.

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energy that always gets renewed from within itself? The main feature of this notion is movement, and several years later Heidegger will concentrate on the notion of movement, especially in the works of Aristotle1. This movement is characterized by a distinct feature: it occurs by interpreting itself every instant, and by taking care of itself. While explaining facticity, Heidegger adopts Augustinian notion of curare – taking care. This continuous self-renewal, i.e. the movement that interprets itself and takes care of itself at the same time is also a temptation, downfall, hurtle, uncontrollable life, and most notably self-distress in the face of death that gives rise to the most general definition of facticity – finitude. We already know what the meaning of these words will obtain for the analysis Dasein. According to Heidegger, self-mobility and self-interpretation, which are the fundamental features of facticity, correspond to the meaning of the most profound notion concerning facticity – intentionality. While intentionality is directed towards the world, it is the factical movement that determines any possible characteristics of the world: the world is meaningfully given (es gibt) through factical movement, the world

“occurs” through factical movement, it “self-occurs” (Es er-eignet mir) through the factical movement that arises from itself and that possesses human consciousness from the very beginning. Most importantly, no subject/object distinction remains here, the world and human consciousness belong to the same factical movement through which any meaning in the world arises simultaneously from both the world and human consciousness. This is why facticity – faktizitä – is distinguishable from actuality – Tatsächlichkeit. Actuality is the perception of reality that follows the division between subject/object, while facticity proclaims simultaneity of the world and the consciousness.

We just referred to the two crucial moments in the philosophy of Heidegger: 1. the interdependency of the world and the consciousness, i.e. their simultaneous identity and difference. The question of simultaneous identity and difference will penetrate through all the reasoning of Heidegger, provoking crises and stages of development: Dasein and Sein; ground and groundless abyss; two different and at the same time equally possible interpretations of ontological difference; truth and [Un]truth; duality of Ereignis; and finally Heidegger’s fruitless efforts to express difference in resemblance at the end of his life, the final crisis of his reasoning that could have led to a new stage. All of the above were already embraced in what Heidegger grasped in 1919 and what he called faktizität. 2. While referring to the simultaneity of the world and the consciousness, we refer to time. The issue of the unity of time is codified in the unity of the world and the consciousness, in facticity. It is the same problem that will remain unsolved in Sein und Zeit and

1 Heidegger M. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. Gesamtausgabe. T. 61. Frankfurt, 1985.

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which will result in fruitless efforts to solve the issue of the meaning of being. In his paper Sein und Zeit that Heidegger presented in 1962 the issue of the unity of time will lead to an impasse when tackling the question of what time is, despite of the discovery of the fourth dimension of time1.

The issue of difference and unity of the world and the consciousness discovered through facticity as well as the issue of unity of time will later manifest itself as uttermost strangely blissful state – Gelassenheit – as a hopeful and desperate exploration of the East, as the insanity of Holderlin, call for gods and the only possible outlook that can be adopted by a reasoning being at the time – waiting for gods2.

What kind of energy can be traced in facticity? Undoubtedly, it is the driving force behind the entire thought of Heidegger. However, we have to acknowledge that Heidegger did not succeed in comprehending fully what exactly he had traced in 1919. In his own words, his entire way of thinking is just a humble beginning of a new thought. This new beginning, undoubtedly, can be seen in the notion of faktizität.3

Bibliography

1.Agamben G. La passion de la facticité. Questions ouvertes. Heidegger. - Paris: Osiris, 1988. C. 63-84.

2.Aleksandravicius P. Temps et éternité chez saint Thomas d’Aquin et Martin

Heidegger. – Saarbrücken : Editions universitaires européennes, 2010.

C.546.

3.Capelle P. Philosophie et théologie dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger. –

Paris: Cerf, 2001. C. 283.

4.Greisch J. L’Arbre de Vie et l’Arbre du savoir. - Paris: Cerf, 2000. C. 335.

5.Heidegger M. Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungs Problem / Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. T. 56-57. - Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987.

C.218.

6.Heidegger M. Die Kategorienund Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus / Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. T.1. - Frankfurt-am-Main: Herrmann, 1978.

C.189-411.

1 Aleksandravicius P. Temps et éternité chez saint Thomas d’Aquin et Martin Heidegger.

Saarbrücke, 2010.

2 Capelle P. Philosophie et théologie dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger. Paris, 2001.

3„Ohne diese theologische Herkunft wäre ich nie auf den Weg des Denkens gelangt. Herkunft aber bleibt stets Zukunft“, Heidegger M. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen, 1959, p. 96.

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7.Heidegger M. Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) / Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. T. 63. - Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1988. C. 116.

8.Heidegger M. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. Gesamtausgabe. T. 61. - Frank- furt-am-Main: Klostermann, 1985. C. 203.

9.Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit. - Tübingen: Niemayer, 1976, p. 72. C. 583.

10.Heidegger M. Unterwegs zur Sprache. – Pfullingen: Neske, 1959. C. 257. 11.Kisiel T. L‘indication formelle de la facticité: sa genèse et sa transformation.

Heidegger 1919-1929 : de l’herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein. - Paris: Vrin, 1996. C. 194-217.

12.Ott H. Martin Heidegger. Eléments pour une biographie. - Paris: Payot, 1988. C. 420.

13.Sloterdijk P. La politique de Heidegger / Magazine littéraire. - Paris, 2006, n. 9. C. 42-45.

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UDC 13

А.M. Sergeev

‘One’s Own’ and Heidegger’s ‘das Man’

Abstract. The article sets out to consider Heidegger’s ‘das Man’ (‘the They’; in Russian translations rendered with the help of the Russian equivalents of

‘people’, ‘someone’, ‘depersonalized man’) as one of Dasein’s principal ‘existentiales’. The author’s analysis of Dasein’s properties and characteristics provides a context for highlighting another of Dasein’s ‘existentiales’, viz. selfhood. The author raises the question of the possibility of interpreting selfhood as

‘one’s own’.

Attention is also given to the role that pronouns play in structuring philosophical discourse.

Keywords: Dasein, das Man, depersonalization, leveling, impersonal boredom, dictatorship of publicity, selfhood, one’s own.

1. Note on the Texts

In the context of this paper, the author draws upon the following texts by Martin Heidegger.

Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs – 1925 (in the Russian translation by Ye.V. Borisov: Prolegomeny k istorii ponyatiya vremeni [History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena]. – Tomsk: Vodolei Publishers, 1998); Sein und Zeit – 1926 (in the Russian translation by V.V. Bibikhin: Bytiye i vremya [Being and Time]. – Moscow: Ad Marginem Publishers, 1997); Die Grundbergriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit– 1929/1930 (in the Russian translation by V.V. Bibikhin, A.V. Akhutin, A.P. Shurbelev: Osnovnye ponyatiya metafiziki: Mir – Konechnost – Odinochestvo [The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude]. – St.Petersburg: Vladimir Dahl Publishers, 2013); Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit– 1930/1931 (in the Russian translation by T.V. Vasilyeva: Ucheniye Platona ob istine [Plato's Doctrine of Truth], in: Istoriko-filosofsky yezhegodnik ’86 [Yearbook of the History of Philosophy, 1986].

– Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1986; and in the Russian translation by V.V. Bibikhin: Ucheniye Platona ob istine [Plato's Doctrine of Truth], in: Heidegger, M. Vremya i bytiye. Statyi ivystupleniya [Time and Being: Articles and Speeches]. – Moscow: Respublika Publishers, 1993); Brief über den “Humanismus” – 1947 (in the Russian translation by V.V. Bibikhin: Pismo o gumanizme [Letter on 'Humanism'], in: Heidegger, M. Vremya i bytiye. Statyi i vystupleniya [Time and Being: Articles and Speeches]. – Moscow: Respublika Publishers, 1993); Zollikoner Seminare – 1959–1969 (Russian translation by I. Glukhova:

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Tsollikonovskiye seminary: Protokoly – Besedy – Pisma [Zollikon Seminars: 19591969]. – Vilnius: European Humanities University, 2012).

2. Das Man

This indefinite-personal pronoun is rendered as lyudi (the Russian for ‘people’; cf. ‘the They’) in V.V. Bibikhin’s translations. In the context of Ye.V. Borisov’s translation strategy ‘das Man’ is understood as nekto (someone). Besides, ‘das Man’ is sometimes rendered as kto-to (somebody) and obezlichennyi chelovek (depersonalized, or impersonalized, man; but the Russian expression may also suggest: faceless man).

An important element in understanding the specifically Heideggerian treatment of ‘das Man’ is the theme of everydayness. According to Heidegger, it is only on the basis of the experience of everydayness that the phenomena of ‘I’ and ‘selfconsciousness’ become possible, and these are the phenomena that ensure the reality of the subject.

‘Das Man’ is one of Dasein’s ‘existentiales’. The human being is not alone in the world, where, alongside things, there are other people, too. Therefore, every human being gets into situations involving other people. One has to agree with Heidegger that even avoiding each other only makes sense to those who are – already – with each other.

In the world of everydayness, Dasein’s horizon of interpretation is connected with concern (care), when human beings understand themselves proceeding from their function, occupation, social status, wealth. This is what is expressed in ‘das Man’. The human being has no selfhood; in a situation where one person does not distinguish himself or herself from another, their selfhood is that of any other. Their

Dasein (their ‘presence’ – prisutstvie – according to V.V. Bibikhin’s translation) is dispersed in ‘das Man’ (in people, in someone).

At the same time, the human being is concerned both about being like other people and about being distinct from others. As part of ‘das Man’, human beings have no face of their own, no fate of their own, nothing at all, in fact, that is their own. The matter is that depersonalized people are as interchangeable as things. Depersonalization leads to equivalence, where calculating thinking reigns supreme, limiting as it does both understanding and the need for understanding. The deepest form of boredom, according to Heidegger, is impersonal boredom. ‘Das Man’ is characterized by the distancing of everyone from everyone else (of everything from everything else), by averageness and leveling.

However, if a human being is ‘nobody’, it is not at all tantamount to being ‘nothing’. The primordial form of our Dasein, both in the ontic and in the ontological sense, is its ‘Uneigentlichkeit’ (inauthenticity). The human Dasein (presence) exists in its everydayness in an inauthentic way. The characteristics of this inau-

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thenticity are impersonality, indefiniteness, anonymity. This kind of Being is not one’s own. But the human Self (what is one’s own) can break free from impersonality and understand itself, i.e. understand its temporality, its finitude, its presence.

Thus, Heidegger distinguishes two kinds of Dasein: ‘das Man’ and Selfhood.

When involved in calculating thinking, human beings cannot reveal their selfhood. It is revealed via the support we derive from understanding, something that calculating thinking does not need at all. Dasein is, in fact, defined as an entity which is capable of asking questions about its Being and of collecting itself in the world, as well as of collecting the world in itself. This is exactly the way the impersonal is dislodged within (from) us.

The sphere of publicity and that of politics are the areas of activity of the depersonalized man (someone; somebody; us), where the preferred choice is that of the ‘average’, rather than the radical and decisive way. In these spheres a leveling of all the possibilities of people’s Being takes place, and ‘decision-making’ is avoided. If we are to speak about ‘us’ by way of ‘das Man’, we are dealing with an inauthentic ‘us’ (with ‘people’ in the sense of the Russian ‘lyudi’), whereas the authenticity of ‘us’ is connected with the people as a whole (in the sense of the Russian ‘narod’). In ‘das Man’ human beings do not live by what is their own. They are entirely and completely connected with an impersonal and anonymous understanding of truth and tradition, and are prone to apply to themselves primarily the technique of causal ‘explanation’, where ‘das Man’ is at work ‘for’ them and ‘instead of’ them.

It becomes the true goal of a human being to learn to ‘exist in a nameless space’. This should, probably, be understood in two senses: both as the task to learn to exist among people, and as the task to learn to exist in oneself, i.e. to exist when being within oneself.

When Dasein becomes dissolved in ‘das Man’, a dictatorship of publicity emerges, where human beings relieve themselves of their responsibility for what is their own, or, to be more precise, for the absence of themselves. They are guided by the ‘accepted’ ways of ‘speaking’ and the accepted ‘views’ and ‘opinions’. The Being of ‘das Man’ has the character of averageness, when the human being relinquishes both risks and freedom.

Publicity is ubiquitous, and within it there is no place for Dasein. It cannot reveal itself here. Publicity can be characterized as ‘now’ which has been matched with ‘then’ and ‘where’. And in this sense, ‘das Man’ is not only a destiny reserved for philistines, it is the lot of all of us, including philosophers, when they ‘become familiar’ with systems of constructions, values and worldviews, beginning to ‘do’ philosophy.

Heidegger’s ‘das Man’ has proved a controversial concept. To give just a couple of examples, Karl Mannheim took a critical view of it; it is also in the con-

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text of repudiating the concept of ‘das Man’ that the key thematic line of Hannah Arendt’s works should be considered, oriented as it was towards the ancient Greek understanding of human essence connected above all with Aristotle. In a sense,

Hannah Arendt’s attitude to Heidegger’s ‘das Man’, given their close philosophical and personal involvement with each other, should be regarded as criticism from

‘within’, as an ‘insider’s’ critical reception.

3. One’s Own

The problem of one’s own which has been at the centre of the author’s attention for the past few years appears to be innerly connected with Heidegger’s philosophy. At least, it is motivated by the thematic lines of his texts, where ‘das Man’ can help to understand many things, or, to be more precise, to emphasize and highlight many things.

What deserves particular attention is the choice of pronouns as referencepoints for thinking. This would appear to be a highly interesting topic for reflection in its own right.

Despite the difficulty of matching Heidegger’s linguistic tools with the language of Russian philosophy, the inner affinity of many of his trains of thought to the Russian language is beyond doubt and is clearly felt in the existing translations.

In this sense, one may speak of the intrinsic value of the ‘Russian Heidegger’ and the ‘Russian Heideggeriana’. It is understandable that the ways of linguistic and philosophical movement in language increasingly manifest themselves as we increase – our – mastery of it, when by turning to its history, its etymology and the way the history of words affects their everyday functioning, we come to see clearly what previously went unnoticed.

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