It is clear upon principle, that since the authority is con-

ferred by the principal, and is to be exercised on his behalf

and for his benefit, the agent should not be permitted to con-

tinue in the exercise of such authority any longer than the

principal desires. The relation is, in a degree, personal and

confidential, and the principal for his own protection should

be able to withdraw his confidence at will. It is therefore the

general rule of law, subject to the exceptions hereafter enu-

1 MacBeath r. Ellis, 4 Bing. 57s ; Butler V. Knight, l. R. 2 Ex. 109.

2 Seton V. Slade, 7 Ves. 265.

* Blackburn v. Scholes, 2 Camp. 3il.

* Iluffcut's Anson on Cent. p. 333 et seq.

6 Post, в§в§ 79-81.

BY ACT OF TIIF, PAKTIES. 79

mernted,^ tliat the principal may revoke his agent's authority at

any time before the authority has been fully exercised, and

with or without good cause.^ And tliis is true even where the

principal has expressly or imi)liedly agreed not to revoke. In

such a case, however, the principal, although he has the potcer,

has not the 7ught to revoke, and the agent has an action against

the principal for any damages suffered by him as a result of

the rovocati(Hi.^

§ 65. Revocation — -what amounts to.

The revocation of the agent's authority may be by the ex-

press act of the principal, or it may be implied from the cir-

cumstances of the case. In the absence of statute, a sealed

or written revocation is unnecessary, even though the author-

Ity was originally conferred by a formal instrument.* The

cii'cumstances from which a revocation will be implied are

Various. If tlie principal, after conferring the authority, but

prior to its execution, disposes of the subject-matter of the

agency, or involuntarily loses control over it, a revocation

must necessarily be implied.^ For example, if a principal con-

fers authority upon an agent to sell his house, and before the

agent accomplishes his object, the house is destroyed by fire

cr sold by the principal himself, the agent is clearly deprived

of his power, and a revocation of authority is therefore pre-

sumed. And so also, if after conferring authority upon an

agent to perform a, specified act, necessarily exclusive, the

principal gives the same power to another, the authority of

the first agent is thereby revoked.^ But it is held that the

authority of an agent to do a specified act is not necessarily

1 Post, В§ 72.

2 Hartley's Appeal, 53 Pa. St. 212; Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa.

St. 266 ; Chambers v. Seay, 73 Ala. 372 ; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat.

(U. S.) 174 ; Venning v. Bray, 2 B. & S. 502 ; Warwick v. Slade, 3 Camp.

127.

8 Chambers v. Seay, supra : Blackstone v. Buttermore, supra ; Mao-

Gregor v. Gardner, 14 Iowa, 326.

* The Margaret Mitchell, Swabey, 382; Brookshire v. Brookshire,

8 Iredell (X. C.) Law, 74.

6 Gilltert v. Holmes, 64 111. 548.

^ Copeland v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 6 Pick. (Mass.) 198.

80 TERMINATION OF AGENCY

revoked by the subsequent cmj)loyment of another to attend

to all business of the principal.^ The dissolution of a corpo-

ration or partnership, or tlic severance of the interests of joint

principals, revokes the autliority of agents.^

^ G6. Revocation, notice of.

A revocation is effectual and binding-, only as against those

who have notice that it has been made. Consequently, in

order to protect himself, the principal must communicate the

revocation not only to the agcnt,^ but to all persons who, u[)on

the strength of his previous authority, are likely to deal with

him.^ In case the authority is only for the performance of a

special act, however, third persons cannot presume that the

agency will continue after the performance of that act, and

therefore no notice of revocation need be communicated to

them." Nor is it necessary to give notice to a sub-agent, de-

riving his authority from the agent alone.

The method by which the revocation should be communi-

cated varies with each particular case, but the notice must

always be sufficient to make the knowledge of the revocation

co-extensive with the knowledge of the authority. Thus, to

persons who have never dealt with the agent, a general notice

through the medium of the public press is sufficient, whether

it is seen or not. But to persons who have transacted busi-

ness with the agent, actual notice must be given, or at least

such knowledge of the revocation must be communicated to

them as would serve to place a prudent man uj)on inquiry.''^ A

1 Smith t'. Lane, 101 Tnd. 449.

2 Schlater c. Wiiipenny, 75 Pa. St. 321 ; Rowe v. Rand, 111 Tnd. 206;

Griggs V. Swift. 82 Ga. 392.

8 See Robertson v. Cloud, 47 Miss. 20S. It seems that a notice left at

the agent's usual place of business is enough to terminate the agency,

even before the agent has actual notice of it. Rees i'. Fellow, 97 Fed.

Rep. 1G7. Compare Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S, 73.

* Tier r. T.ampson, 3.5 Vt. 179 ; Fellows v. Hartford, &c. Co., 38 Conn.

197; Lamothe v. St. Louis, &c. Co., 17 Mo. 204; McXeilly v. Continental

Lifeln.s. Co , 66 N.Y. 23.

6 Watts V. Kavanagh, 35 Vt. 34.

6 ClaHin v. Lenheim, G6 N. Y. 301, 305.

BY ACT OF THE I'AUTIES. 81

failure to protect third persons l)y due notice may give rise to

an agency by estoppel.^

В§ 67. Revocatioii, effect of, as to principal and agent.

It appears, therefore, that unless the agent's authority is

coupled with an interest, the principal has the j^owe?* to revoke

it at any time, and with or without good cause. It docs not

always follow, however, that he has the right to revoke with-

out incurring liability for breach of contract. Where there is

an agreement, express or implied, that the relation shall en-

dure for a definite time, the principal cannot revoke without

subjecting himself to liability for the damages resulting to the

agcnt.2 Of course, this rule docs not apply in case the agent

has broken an express or implied condition in the original

contract. For instance, every contract of agency contains the

implied condition that the agent will faithfully, honestly, and

diligently perform his duty, and if he fails so to do, the prin-

cipal may revoke his authority without liability.^ Unless

guilty of gross and wilful misconduct, the agent is entitled,

upon revocation, to reasonable remuneration for his past ser-

vices and expenditures, and, if nothing further remains to be

done, to full remuneration.*

В§ 68. Revocation, effect of, as to third persons.

It has already been seen that the revocation of an agent's

authority is effectual as to all persons who have notice that it

lias been made, the character of the notice depending upon

circumstances. If sufficient notice has not been given, and

the third person has no knowledge of the revocation, he may

presume that the agency still exists, and his subsequent deal-

ings with the agent are binding and enforceable against the prin-

cipal.s In such case the jjrincipal is estopped to deny the agency.

^ A nte, В§ 50 et seq.

2 Lewis V. Atlas, &c. Ins. Co , 61 Mo. 534; Standard Oil Co. v. Gil-

bert, 84 Ga. 7U.

3 Dieringer v. Meyer, 42 Wis. 311 ; pnxt, В§ 87.

в– * Sumner v. Reicheniker, 9 Kansas, 320; post, В§ 79.

5 Anon. V Harrison, 12 :Mod. 34(5; Truenian v. Loder, 11 A. & E.

589: Clafliu v. Lenheini, 66 N. Y, 301 ; Fellows v. Hartford, &c. Co., 38

6

82 TKK.MINATION OF AGENCY

В§ 69. Renunciation.

The agent, like the principal, may terminate the relation at

will. And so also, his renunciation, if not express, may be

implied from the circumstances. Thus, if the agent abandons

his work, the principal is justified in regarding his authority

as renounced.^

The renunciation becomes operative, as between ])rincipal

and agent, when knowledge of it actually reaches the princi-

pal. And the principal, as in the case of his own revocation,

must notify third persons in order to protect himself from lia-

bility for the subsequent fraudulent dealings of the agent.^