In the ordinary course of a trade, business, or profession, and

delegated to perform a siugle act, or even a number of dis-

connected particular acts, can possess but a very narrow limit

of incidental authority beyond the limits of the real or actual

authority. There is, therefore, little to rely upon except the

actual authority. But as to that little (and it varies in degree,

even as in agencies of wider scope) the third person may rely

upon it as safely as upon the larger incidental powers flowing

from a general agency. In neither case will any private

Instructions to the agent, intended to limit the ostensible

authority, be effective as against one who deals with the agent

in ignorance of such instructions.^

" Whether, therefore, an agency is general or special is

wholly independent of the question whether the power to act

within the scope of the authority given is unrestricted, or

whether it is restrained by instructions or conditions imposed

by the principal relative to the mode of its exercise." ^

" Where private instructions are given to a special agent,

respecting the mode and manner of executing his agency,

intended to be kept secret, and not communicated to those

with whom he may deal, such instructions are not to be

regarded as limitations upon his authority ; and notwith-

standing he disregards them, his act, if otherwise within the

scope of his agency, will be valid, and bind his employer. . . .

1 Hatch V. Taylor, 10 N. H. 538; Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84; Towle

V. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360; Byrne v. Massasoit Packing Co., 137 Mass.

313 ; Wilson v. Beardsley, 20 Neb. 449. Cf. Baines v. Ewing, 4 H. & C.

511. . .

2 Butler V. Maples, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 766, 774. A j'^ ^^\ Q^^'^Jj-j, %,T

134 rRINCIPAL AND THIRD PARTY.

No man is at liberty to send another into the market, to buy

or sell for him, as his agent, with secret instructions as to

the manner in which he shall execute his agency, which are

not to be communicated to those with whom he is to deal ;

and then, when his agent has deviated from those instruc-

tions, to say that he was a special agent — that the instruc-

tions were limitations upon his autliority — and that those

with whom he dealt, in the matter of his agency, acted at

their peril, because they were bound to inquire, where inquiry

would have been fruitless, and to ascertain that, of which

they were not to have knowledge." ^ This doctrine })laces

special agencies upon the same footing as general agencies ;

each is to be measured by the appearance of authority upon

which reasonably {)rudcnt men may rely. " The rule is, that

If a special agent exercise the power exhibited to the public

the principal will be bound, even if the agent has received

private instructions which limit his special authority." ^

§ 105. Same. — Public agents.

" Different rules prevail in respect to the acts and declara-

tions of public agents from those whicli ordinarily govern in

the case of mere private agents. Principals, in the latter

category, are in many cases bound by the acts and declara-

tions of their agents, even where the act or declaration was

done or made without any authority, if it appear that the act

was done or declaration was made by the agent in the course

of his regular em{)loyment; but the government or ))ublic

authority is not bound in such a case, unless it manifestly

appears that the agent was acting within the scope of his

authority, or that he had been held out as having authority

to do the act, or was emjjloyed in his capacity as a public

agent to do the act or make the declaration for the govern-

ment. . . . Although a private agent, acting in violation of

specific instructions, yet within the scope of his general

authority, may bind his principal, the rule as to the effect of