книги / Международные отношения России теория и история

4. На основании метода когнитивного картирования сделайте вывод о целях и стратегиях наиболее значимых исторических личностей периода.

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5.Прочитайте статью из «Washington Post» о Первой мировой войне. Проведите контент-анализ текста. Сделайте выводы о позициях автора.

6.Найдите русскоязычные источники, дающие оценку Первой мировой войне. Насколько оценки русскоязычных и англоязычных изданий совпадают?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2017/04/06/06a8bcae- 1597-11e7-9e4f-09aa75d3ec57_story.html?utm_term=.5847de0986f8

Five myths about World War I

By Michael Kazin April 6, 2017

One hundred years ago, on April 6, 1917, Congress voted to declare war on imperial Germany. The First World War was the pivot of the 20th century: It took the lives of 17 million people and resulted in the collapse of three major empires (the German, the Ottoman and the AustroHungarian). In the aftermath, totalitarian regimes both right and left came to power, leading to a second, far bloodier global conflict. Alas, for most Americans, the “Great War” holds little interest, particularly compared with the Civil War, World War II and Vietnam – all conflicts remembered as titanic moral struggles that transformed the nation. This neglect has given rise to some serious misconceptions about the war in which more than 116,000 Americans died.

Myth No. 1

The United States was neutral, in fact as well as name, until 1917. America was an “exemplar of peace,” according to the title of the

first chapter of Margaret E. Wagner’s forthcoming history of the United States during the war, sponsored by the Library of Congress. The keepers of Woodrow Wilson’s post-presidential home in Washington

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echo that conventional wisdom: His “primary goal at the outset of the European war . . . was to maintain American neutrality and to help broker peace between the warring parties.” In August 1914, Wilson called upon Americans to be “neutral in fact as well as name,” and in 1916, he ran for reelection on the slogan “He kept us out of war.” Wilson hoped, at some point, to mediate an end to the carnage.

But his private sympathies were never in doubt. A German victory, the president told his closest adviser when the war began, “would change the course of our civilization and make the United States a military nation.” So the federal government did little to prevent U.S. businesses from selling goods and lending money to Britain and France. Bethlehem Steel made arms for the Allies, and the investment house of J.P. Morgan and Co. served as the British government’s exclusive purchasing agent in the United States. By war’s end, the total cost to king and country came to $3 billion; J.P. Morgan collected a tidy 1 percent commission on every sale. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy was blockading the North Sea, making it all but impossible for American firms to do business with Germany – a disparity Wilson complained about briefly and only in the mildest terms.

Myth No. 2

Americans who actively opposed going to war were isolationists. There is no myth more powerful than the notion that most

Americans resisted intervention because they wanted to remain aloof from the problems besetting the rest of the world. In 1952, journalist Walter Lippmann recalled that “the isolationists were the party of neutrality and of pacifism.” More recently, Wilson biographer A. Scott Berg reflected that the president was “speaking to an isolationist nation” when he asked Congress to declare war in April 1917.

But both writers ignore the internationalist creed and connections held by the key leaders of the antiwar coalition. Jane Addams presided over a pacifist women’s conference in Europe. Morris Hillquit, a leading socialist, tried to travel to Stockholm to meet with comrades from other nations to formulate a peace plan. In 1915, Sen. Robert La Follette urged the Senate to pass a resolution in support of a conference of neutral nations, and in 1917, in a speech preceding his vote against a declaration of war, he offered praise for Germany’s social and industrial reforms. Industrialist Henry Ford

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chartered an ocean liner to transport himself and dozens of other activists across the Atlantic, where they lobbied neutral governments to embrace a peace plan they would press on the warring powers.

These Americans, like many prominent critics of the war elsewhere in the world, wanted a new global order based on cooperative relationships among nations and gradual disarmament. Militarism, they argued, isolated peoples behind walls of mutual fear and loathing. Of course, not all Americans who tried to stop the rush to war shared this global outlook. But they did fear the growth of a huge standing army that might be used in future conflicts abroad.

Myth No. 3

Opposition essentially dissolved once the United States declared war. Accounts of wartime politics at home usually focus on the stringent

Espionage and Sedition acts of 1917 and 1918. Conservative author Wendy McElroy writes that these laws “were used to destroy what was left of the left wing in America.” Berg reports that the nation “entered a period of repression as egregious as any in American history.”

Yet, despite the legal challenges, many peace advocates refused to remain silent and even thrived for a time. Some organized the People’s Council of America for Democracy and Peace to demand free speech and oppose the draft. In late May 1917, the council attracted a crowd of more than 15,000 to Madison Square Garden, despite efforts by New York police to intimidate those who attended. Other antiwar stalwarts established the National Civil Liberties Bureau (renamed the ACLU in 1920) to defend Americans prosecuted for exercising their First Amendment rights. And in the fall of 1917, Hillquit ran for mayor of New York on an antiwar platform; in a four-man race, he won almost a quarter of the vote. In several other big cities – Buffalo; Chicago; Dayton, Ohio; and Rochester, N.Y. – socialist candidates also exceeded totals beyond what the party had achieved in prewar contests.

Myth No. 4

African Americans eagerly backed the war, hoping to win equal rights by doing so.

“Many black American leaders, such as W. E. B. DuBois, supported the war effort and sought a place at the front for black soldiers,”

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according to a popular online textbook. “Black leaders viewed military service as an opportunity to demonstrate to white society the willingness and ability of black men to assume all duties and responsibilities of citizens.” The historian David Kennedy quotes a black assistant to the secretary of war as a stand-in for the majority of African Americans: “This is not the time to discuss race problems,” asserted Emmett Scott. “Our first duty is to fight. . . . Then we can adjust the problems that remain in the life of the colored man.”

But other black leaders, such as A. Philip Randolph and Ida WellsBarnett, refused to encourage African Americans to join a segregated army to fight for a democracy abroad that they did not enjoy at home. And quite a few ordinary black people agreed. In July 1917, marchers took to the streets in several cities to protest the killing by a white mob of as many as 100 black residents of East St. Louis, Ill. Some of the demonstrators in New York carried posters demanding that Wilson “Bring Democracy to America Before You Carry It to Europe.”

In the summer of 1917, a group of black infantrymen stationed in Houston who had been attacked by local police protested in a particularly grisly fashion. They marched out of their camp and killed 15 white residents, including several white soldiers. After some of the culprits were executed, Wells-Barnett ordered a batch of buttons describing them as martyrs.

Most black draftees grudgingly joined the rigorously segregated army, but few saw combat; they were, instead, assigned to menial labor done in uniform.

Myth No. 5

Nearly all young men obeyed the new conscription law.

There had been no draft since the Civil War, and most historians are impressed that, as G.J. Meyer puts it in a new book, “more than nine and a half million men registered” on the day in June 1917 when it was initiated; “it all went as smoothly as anyone could have hoped.” The Library of Congress history echoes that view: “Predictions of widespread disorder,” Wagner writes, “proved unfounded” as those men “signed up with Uncle Sam, cheered on by their fellow citizens.” It is easy to assume that young Americans rushed to obey the demand of James Montgomery Flagg’s iconic Uncle Sam poster: “I want you.”

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But in fact, resistance to conscription was quite strong. By the end of the war, the ranks of noncooperators were stunningly large. Roughly 3 million eligible men never registered, in violation of the law – compared with the 24 million who did. And some 338,000 who did register either failed to obey an induction notice or deserted after they joined the ranks. The Justice Department was able to arrest only a small percentage of these lawbreakers. A large number of Mexican Americans and others slipped across the southern border, where prosecutors could not touch them. Altogether, a higher percentage of American men successfully resisted conscription during World War I than during the Vietnam War half a century later.

7.Какие причины поражения А. Гитлера во II Мировой войне называет автор статьи в «The Guardian»? Насколько его точка зрения соответствует российским источникам?

8.Составьте словарь прецизионной лексики по теме с учётом традиций её перевода на русский язык.

9.Выпишите лексику военно-исторической тематики, найдите для неё русские эквиваленты.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/08/hitler-germany- campaign-collapsed

Why Hitler's grand plan during the second world war collapsed

Richard J Evans

Tuesday 8 September 2009 12.01 BST

Two key factors undermined Germany's campaign: US involvement boosted the allies' arms-producing capabilities, while sheer Soviet manpower led to catastrophic defeat in Russia.

Two years into the war, in September 1941, German arms seemed to be carrying all before them. Western Europe had been decisively conquered, and there were few signs of any serious resistance to German rule. The failure of the Italians to establish Mussolini's much-vaunted new Roman empire in the Mediterranean had been made good by German intervention. German forces had overrun Greece, and subjugated Yugoslavia. In north Africa, Rommel's brilliant generalship was pushing

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the British and allied forces eastwards towards Egypt and threatening the Suez canal. Above all, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 had reaped stunning rewards, with Leningrad (the present-day St Petersburg) besieged by German and Finnish troops, Smolensk and Kiev taken, and millions of Red Army troops killed or captured in a series of vast encircling operations that brought the German armed forces within reach of Moscow. Surrounded by a girdle of allies, from Vichy France and Finland to Romania and Hungary, and with the more or less benevolent neutrality of countries such as Sweden and Switzerland posing no serious threat, the Greater German Reich seemed to be unstoppable in its drive for supremacy in Europe.

Yet in retrospect this proved to be the high point of German success. The fundamental problem facing Hitler was that Germany simply did not have the resources to fight on so many different fronts at the same time. Leading economic managers such as Fritz Todt had already begun to realise this. When Todt was killed in a plane clash on 8 February 1942, his place as armaments minister was taken by Hitler's personal architect, the young Albert Speer. Imbued with an unquestioning faith in Hitler and his will to win, Speer restructured and rationalised the arms production system, building on reforms already begun by Todt. His methods helped increase dramatically the number of planes and tanks manufactured in German plants, and boosted the supply of ammunition to the troops.

US military might

But by the end of 1941 the Reich had to contend not only with the arms production of the British empire and the Soviet Union but also with the rapidly growing military might of the world's economic superpower, the United States. Throughout 1941, rightly fearing the consequences of total German domination of Europe for America's position in the world, US President Franklin D Roosevelt had begun supplying Britain with growing quantities of arms and equipment, guaranteed through a system of "lend-lease" and formalised in August by the Atlantic Charter. When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in early December, Hitler saw the opportunity to attack American convoys without inhibition, and declared

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war on the US in the belief that Roosevelt would be too preoccupied with countering the Japanese advance in the Pacific to trouble overmuch with events in Europe.

Yet such was the economic might of the Americans that they could pour increasing resources into the conflict in both theatres of war. Germany produced 15,000 new combat aircraft in 1942, 26,000 in 1943, and 40,000 in 1944. In the US, the figures were 48,000, 86,000 and 114,000 respectively. Added to these were the aircraft produced in the Soviet Union – 37,000 in 1943, for example – and the UK: 35,000 in 1943 and 47,000 in 1944. It was the same story with tanks, where 6,000 made in Germany each year had to face the same number produced annually in Britain and the Dominions, and three times as many in the Soviet Union. In 1943 the combined allied production of machine-guns exceeded 1 million, compared with Germany's 165,000. Nor did Germany's commandeering of the economies of other European countries do much to redress the balance. The Germans' ruthless requisitioning of fuel, industrial facilities and labour from France and other countries reduced the economies of the subjugated parts of Europe to such a state that they were unable – and, with their workers becoming ever more refractory, unwilling – to contribute significantly to German war production.

Above all, the Reich was short of fuel. Romania and Hungary supplied a large proportion of Germany's needs. But this was not enough to satisfy the appetite of the Wehrmacht's gas-guzzling tanks and fighter planes. Rommel's eastward push across northern Africa was designed not just to cut off Britain's supply route through the Suez canal but above all to break through to the Middle East and gain control over the region's vast reserves of oil. In mid-1942 he captured the key seaport of Tobruk. But when he resumed his advance, he was met with massive defensive positions prepared by the meticulous British general Bernard Montgomery at El Alamein. Over 12 days he failed to break through the British lines and was forced into a headlong retreat across the desert. To complete the rout, the allies landed an expeditionary force further west, in Morocco and Algeria. A quarter of a million German and Italian troops surrendered in May 1943. Rommel had already returned to

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Germany on sick leave. "The war in north Africa," he concluded bitterly, "was decided by the weight of Anglo-American material." If he had been provided with "more motorised formations", and a more secure supply line, he believed, he could still have driven through to the oilfields of the Middle East. But it was not to be.

By the time of Montgomery's victory, it had become clear that the Germans' attempt to compensate for their lower levels of arms production by stopping American supplies and munitions from reaching Britain across the Atlantic had also failed. In the course of 1942, a determined construction campaign increased the number of U-boats active in the Atlantic and the Arctic from just over 20 to more than 100; in November 1942 alone they sank 860,000 tonnes of allied shipping, aided by the Germans' ability to decipher British radio traffic while keeping their own secret.

Battle of the Atlantic

But from December 1942, the British could decode German ciphers once more and steer their convoys away from the waiting wolf-packs of U-boats. Small aircraft carriers began to accompany allied convoys, using spotter planes to locate the German submarines, which had to spend most of their time on the surface in order to move with any reasonable speed and locate the enemy's ships. By May 1943 the allies were building more ship tonnage than the Germans were sinking, while one U-boat was being sunk by allied warships and planes on average every day. On 24 May 1943 the commander of the U-boat fleet, Admiral Karl Dönitz, conceded defeat and moved his submarines out of the north Atlantic. The battle of the Atlantic was over.

The most dramatic and most significant reversal of German fortunes came, however, on the eastern front. The sheer scale of the conflict between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army dwarfed anything seen anywhere else during the second world war. From 22 June 1941, the day of the German invasion, there was never a point at which less than twothirds of the German armed forces were engaged on the eastern front. Deaths on the eastern front numbered more than in all the other theatres of war put together, including the Pacific. Hitler had expected the Soviet

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Union, which he regarded as an unstable state, ruled by a clique of "Jewish Bolsheviks" (a bizarre idea, given the fact that Stalin himself was an antisemite), exploiting a vast mass of racially inferior and disorganised peasants, to crumble as soon as it was attacked.

But it did not. On the contrary, Stalin's patriotic appeals to his people helped rally them to fight in the "great patriotic war", spurred on by horror at the murderous brutality of the German occupation. More than three million Soviet prisoners of war were deliberately left to die of starvation and disease in makeshift camps. Civilians were drafted into forced labour, villages were burned to the ground, towns reduced to rubble. More than one million people died in the siege of Leningrad; but it did not fall. Soviet reserves of manpower and resources were seemingly inexhaustible. In a vast effort, major arms and munitions factories had been dismantled and transported to safety east of the Urals. Here they began to pour out increasing quantities of military hardware, including the terrifying "Stalin organ", the Katyusha rocket-launcher. In the longer run, the Germans were unable to match any of this; even if some of their hardware, notably the Tiger and Panther tanks, was better than anything the Russians could produce, they simply could not get them off the production lines in sufficient quantities to make a decisive difference.

War in the snow

Already in December 1941, Japan's entry into the war, and its consequent preoccupation with campaigns in the Pacific, allowed Stalin to move large quantities of men and equipment to the west, where they brought the German advance to a halt before Moscow. Unprepared for a winter war, poorly clad, and exhausted from months of rapid advance and bitter fighting, the German forces had to abandon the idea of taking the Russian capital. A whole string of generals succumbed to heart attacks or nervous exhaustion, and were replaced; Hitler himself took over as commander-in-chief of the army.

Hitler had already weakened the thrust towards Moscow by diverting forces to take the grainfields of the Ukraine and push on to the Crimea. For much of 1942, this tactic seemed to be succeeding. German forces

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