66b9uk5yPH

czar had to overcome the resistance of the aristocracy and clergy and was also known for punishing opposition to his reforms1.

Consiglieri Pedroso mentions Russia once again a few pages over, this time focusing on the first partition of Poland (1773) and on the Treaty of Kuçüc

Kaynarca (1774) 2 , presented as hallmarks of Russian foreign policy, microcosms of larger Russian objectives: expanding towards the Ottoman Empire and Eastern Europe, eventually guaranteeing hegemony over the Slavic race.

The Author argues the Russo Turkish wat of 1768-74 was started by French pressure on Turkey. According to his account, the French, not wanting to overtly back the revolting Catholics in Poland, prodded the Porte to take up arms against Russia. The Russian empire, having to control an unruly protectorate and fight a war at the same time, proceeded to agree to partition Poland together with Austria and Prussia and defeat the Ottoman empire3.

The Bar Confederation, that formed in 1768 to oppose the Russian backed King of Poland Stanislaw-August Poniatowsky (1732-1798), starting a war that lasted until 17724, was backed by France, Turkey and Austria, but the RussoTurkish war of 1768-74 started after Russia followed Cossack uprisers5 into Ottoman controlled territory, starting the war6. The partition was agreed upon in 1772, after Frederick I of Prussia (1657-1713) warned Russia that her expansion could lead to a response from Austria and France. Austrian annexation of territories in the Carpathian border convinced Catherine II (1729-1796) the partition was the sensible action to take, considering Poland’s permanently unruly state7 . Two years later, the treaty of Kuçüc Kaynarca enshrined the

Russian victory over the Ottoman Empire, granting Russia control over the Crimean Khanate, and although its articles did not clearly state it, created the perception that Russia was to be considered the protector of Orthodox Christians within the Empire 8 . War flared up again in 1787. Russia, now allied with Austria, assured her presence in the shores of the Black sea and encroached more and more on Ottoman territory. As a result, Turkish commerce routes

1 RIASANOVSKY, Nicholas Valentine, A History of Russia (6th ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 218-221.

2PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Manual de Historia Universal, Paris, Guillard, Aillaud e Cia., 1884, p. 333-334.

3Idem, Ibidem.

4LUKOWSKI, Jerzy, ZAWADZKI, Hubert, A Concise History of Poland (2nd ed.), New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 116.

5DAVIES, Norman, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. I, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 392.

6HOWARD, Douglas A., A History of The Ottoman Empire, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 327.

7LUKOWSKI, Jerzy, ZAWADZKI, Hubert, Ibidem, p. 119-120.

8HOWARD, Douglas A., Ibidem, p. 334-335.

130

suffered under the 1774 treaty. After the death of Abdul-Hamid I (1725-1789) in 1789, Selim III (1761-1808) tried to secure a victory. He succeeded in taking back Belgrade from Austria, after the alliance between her and Russia broke down, but Catherine II still won the war, reaffirming Russian control of Crimea and her presence on the shores of the Black Sea. The Treaty of Jassy (1792), which Consiglieri Pedroso references as making the Dniester the border between the Russian and Ottoman empires1, was the result2.

Entering the “Contemporary Age”, Consiglieri Pedroso’s first mention of

Russia concerns the Crimean war (1853-1856). He synthesis the conflict by arguing that Napoleon III (1808-1873) and the British fought Russia over

Crimea “because of the Eastern Question”3.

Nicholas I (1796-1855) was interested in protecting Russian interests in the Balkans, the Black Sea and Constantinople, even though his ideas collided with the interests of Britain and France, to which the czar’s foreign policy goals seemed to encompass expansion towards the Straits4. The Eastern Question was also at hand: the slow decline of the Ottoman Empire opened the stage for Balkan nationalism, which, in many cases, saw Russia as an ally and liberator5. Nonetheless, Britain worried that the metaphorical death of the sick man of Europe, whether natural or induced, could clear the path to Russian expansion not only towards the Straits, but also in the East, where it could threaten India. A maintenance of the Sultan’s evanescing authority was thus a necessity6.

Build-up of Russian presence in the Holy Land was clear to European commentators of the 1840’s and early 1850’s. Russian pilgrims were the most numerous in Jerusalem, their devotion was ardent, and the empire invested in facilities for their faithful7. The matter was not only one of devotion: successive czars since 1774 considered themselves to be the protectors of the Holy Sites and Orthodox faith in Palestine, which collided with the supposed role of France as protector of the same places of devotion and of Catholics within the Ottoman empire’s borders8.

The quarrelling aided French interests: isolated from the Concert of Europe after the Congress of Vienna, Louis Napoleon was happy to find something that could come between Austria, Britain and Russia9 and his support

1PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Ibidem, pp. 333-334.

2HOWARD, Douglas A., Ibidem, p. 343-344.

3PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Ibidem, p. 368.

4ROYLE, Trevor, Crimea: The Great Crimean War 1854-1856, New York, Saint Martin’s

Press, 2014, pp. 8-10.

5Idem, Ibidem.

6Idem, Ibidem.

7FIGES, Orlando, Crimean war: A History, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2001, pp. 18-21.

8Idem, Ibidem, p. 32.

9Idem, Ibidem, p. 36.

131

support for Catholic interests solidified his position as ruler of France, helping him to declare himself emperor in 18511. His dedication payed off. After having having gone back on his decision twice during 1852, in December the Sultan ordered the keys to the Church of the Nativity, the point of contention between Russia and France, to be given to Latin priests2.

Russia responded by moving troops to the border with the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in January 1853, hoping to secure British backing for her plans as well3. To force the Porte to restore Russia’s protection of the Holy Places, and to accept the role of Russia as protector of the Orthodox faith in the Ottoman Empire 4 , the czar dispatched Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov (1787-1869) to Constantinople in February 18535. If the the Turks did not accept Menshikov’s demands, an occupation of the Danubian principalities would follow6. Diplomatic relations broke down on the 21st of May7. The Russian armies moved into the principalities at the end of July8. A peaceful settlement was championed by other European powers (although France and Britain kept a fleet near Constantinople since June), but the Ottoman Empire would declare war in the 4th of October 18539.

On the 27th of February 1854, the British sent the count of Nesselrode,

Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, an ultimatum to withdraw from the principalities by the end of April. France did the same10. After the czar denied complying with the ultimatums, war was declared in the last week of March11.

The fall of Sevastopol in 1855 cleared the path for peace and the Congress of Paris started on the 25th of February 1856, with the presence of France, Russia, Prussia, Sardinia and Great Britain12. According to the treaty of Paris (1856), the Danubian principalities became autonomous, Russia lost her role as protector of the Orthodox faith within the Ottoman Empire, navigation in the

1ROYLE, Trevor, Ibidem, p. 6.

2Idem, Ibidem, p. 19.

3SMALL, Hugh, The Crimean War: Europe’s Conflict with Russia, Gloucestershire, The History Press, 2018, pp. 17-20.

4PELLISTRANDI, Benoît, As Relações Internacionais de 1800 a 1871, Lisbon, Edições 70,

2017, p. 106.

5ROYLE, Trevor, Ibidem, pp. 32-35.

6FIGES, Orlando, Ibidem, pp. 109-110.

7Idem, Ibidem, pp. 110-115.

8SMALL, Hugh, Ibidem, p. 20.

9PELLISTRANDI, Benoît, Ibidem, p. 106.

10ROYLE, Trevor, Ibidem, pp. 115-117.

11FIGES, Orlando, Ibidem, pp. 145-146.

12PELLISTRANDI, Benoît, Ibidem, p. 108.

132

Danube River was considered free and warships were barred from entering the Black Sea1.

These clauses, however, would not prevent further modification to the geography of the region. Overleaf his reference to the Crimean war, Consiglieri Pedroso mentions the tendency he felt existed in the XIXth century for the creation of new nations “through affinity of language, or through a community of traditions and interests or through geographical contiguity.”2 The new nations nations mentioned are Belgium, Egypt and the nations formed from the Danubian Principalities (Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria), born after

“the latest war of the East”. According to the Author’s position, these countries were liberated from “the decrepit Ottoman Empire” through “Russia’s efforts, which although they are self-serving, have allowed for important victories for the cause of civilization and progress in the East”3.

Romania was independent from 1856 on, Serbia gained de facto independence de 1867 and Montenegro was autonomous, under European protection, since 18584. Revolts against the sultan’s authority started in 1875 in

Bosnia and Herzegovina and spilled over into Bulgaria 5 , causing a violent

reaction from the Ottoman empire, and a defeat of a Serbian offence against it in 18766.

Russia seemed primed to intervene, even if under the self-serving pretence, as Consiglieri Pedroso noted, of expanding towards the Straits and promoting the russification of the Balkans7. The Russian Empire declared war on the 24th of April 1877, but its push for Constantinople bogged down in

Plevna. The czar’s troops reached Adrianople in 1878, prompting a British response that resulted in the Russian assault stopping in San Stefano. The homonymous preliminary treaty was signed on the 3rd of March 18788. The Congress of Berlin (13th of June – 13th of July 1878), headed by Otto Von Bismarck, which resulted in the treaty of Berlin (1878), granted Serbia and Montenegro independence (although the Turkish sanjak of Novi Pazar still separated them), divided Bulgaria in two principalities, with eastern Rumelia

1Idem, ibidem.

2PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Ibidem, p. 369.

3Idem, Ibidem, pp. 369-372.

4PELLISTRANDI, Benoît, Ibidem, p. 109.

5MILZA, Pierre, Ibidem, p. 24.

6BELL, Walter, F., “Russo-Ottoman war, 1877-1878” in HALL, Richard C. (ed.), War in the Balkans: An Encyclopaedic History from the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Breakup of Yugoslavia, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2014, pp. 252-253.

7MILZA, Pierre, Ibidem, p. 25.

8BELL, Walter, F., Ibidem, pp. 257.

133

remaining under Turkish special administration and gave Austria-Hungary the possibility of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina in the future1.

Having summed up the history of Russian foreign policy since the reign of Peter I, Consiglieri Pedroso puts forward a position on the maximum legitimate expansion of the Russian border, based upon the concept of civilization. Although he considered Russia “due to her relative civilization, her resources and her vastness, the hegemonic power of the Slavic world” 2 , he argued Pan-Slavism, the “moral union of Slavism”, was yet to become a reality3 and that “if a regime of liberty does not come to profoundly influence the political conditions of the [Russian] empire”, it could become “a domineering influence” over the “Slavic race”4.

3.2. “The natural order of things” (1889)

This view of Russia as a menacing power was echoed five years later in

Consiglieri Pedroso’s newspaper, Os Debates. Russia left the congress of Berlin without having been able to fulfil much of the czar’s goals. Alexander II (18181881) considered that Austria-Hungary, Russia’s competitor in the Balkans, had had much more to gain from the treaty. For this reason, he denounced the agreement he had signed in 1873 5 . Nonetheless, Germany’s alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1879 and Bismarck’s overtures to Britain6 convinced Russia Russia that she might become isolated in the continent7. Therefore, by promising promising to keep the status quo in the Balkans, while receiving the possibility of coming to unite Bulgaria, although having to accept that Austria-Hungary could occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alexander III (1845-1894), after

Alexander II’s death, signed a new iteration of the 1873 agreement in 1881.

A year later, Bismarck was able to drive Italy to join his alliance. Even though the country worried for the fate of its irredentist provinces, the

humiliation it had suffered in Tunisia led it to join the chancellor’s system on the

20th of May 18828.

Yet, the alliance did not benefit Russia’s Balkan aspirations: In Serbia, prince Milan Obrenović (1854-1901) signed a treaty with Austria-Hungary in

1HALL, Richard C., The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the first World War, London, Routledge, 2000, pp. 3-4.

2PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Ibidem, p. 381.

3Idem, Ibidem.

4Idem, Ibidem, pp. 334-335.

5MILZA, Pierre, Ibidem, p. 29.

6Idem, Ibidem, p. 29-32.

7GERD, Lora, Russian Policy in the Orthodox East: The Patriarchate of Constantinople (1878-1914), Berlin, Sciendo (de Gruyter), 2014, p. 3.

8MILZA, Pierre, Ibidem, p. 33.

134

1881 placing Serbia’s foreign policy decisions under Austrian approval1. The treaty made him king in 18822. In Romania, king Carol I Hohenzollern (18391914) entered a defensive alliance with Austria in 1883, overtly against Russia3. In Bulgaria, Alexander I of Battenberg (1857-1893) declared the country’s independence in 1885, uniting the principalities. Russia supported a coup that drove the king out of power on September 7th, 1886. Yet, in July 1887, Ferdinand I of Saxe-Coburg (1861-1948), open to Austrian influence, was elected monarch. Russia denied renewing the dreikaiserbund in 1887 4 , but signed the “counter-security” treaty with Germany in June the same year.

Although it went against the promises Germany had made to Austria-Hungary concerning her Balkan pretensions, it guaranteed Russian neutrality in case of a defensive war against France, with Russia receiving the Reich’s approval of her objectives of expanding towards the straits5.

It was this context that Consiglieri Pedroso wrote that “(…) simply by the natural order of things (…)”, in the Balkans, a matter that could be solved by a diplomatic envoy could result in a war “(…) of half of Europe against the other half (…).” 6 . His position was based on prince Nikola Petrovich Nejgosh’s

(1841-1921) foreign policy decisions for Montenegro, particularly those concerning royal marriages, in particular: “(…) the projected marriage of princess Militza with the grand-duke Peter Nicolaiewitch, second son of the grand-duke Nicholas, uncle of the emperor of Russia (…).” The contention came from the fact that, at a banquet celebrating the coming marriage, the czar of Russia had referred to Montenegro as “(…) the only loyal and sincere friend of Russia.”7

The bond between the two countries had grown stronger after the results of the Berlin Congress and the Bulgarian crisis (1885-1888). Moreover, since Serbia was now closer to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro was a more valuable ally in the region, that Russia could use to counterbalance Austria’s presence in the Balkans 8 , as Consiglieri Pedroso noted, writing that the country could become Russia’s diplomatic and military “(…) base of operations (…)” against

1GLENNY, Misha, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-2012, Toronto, House of Anansi Press, 2012, p.150.

2PIERPAOLI JR., Paul G., “Obrenović, Milan (1854-1901)” in War in the Balkans: An Ecnyclopedic History from the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Breakup of Yugoslavia, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2014, p.209.

3MILZA, Pierre, Ibidem, p. 37.

4Idem, Ibidem, pp. 37-38.

5Idem, Ibidem, p. 42.

6PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri (dir.), Os Debates, Year II, nº259, Lisboa, [s.n.], 6th of June 1889, p. 2.

7Idem, Ibidem.

8GERD, Lora, Ibidem, pp. 1-5.

135

the Dual Monarchy1. Nonetheless, such possibilities roused the Author’s fears concerning Russian expansion. Commenting once more on the czar’s words he asked: “Did [the czar] mean that the fate of all Balkan sates, except that of Montenegro of course, is of no concern to him and hence, he has complete freedom to act?”2.

3.3. Republican Pan-Slavism (1896-1907)

Consiglieri Pedroso relaxed his position in 1896, when he travelled to Russia. The formation of the Double Alliance, hindering Bismarck’s carefully crafted diplomatic net, had brought together Russia and France. The Author, as a Pan-Latinist and Russophile, saw the alliance an important device to disallow Germany from expanding.

The counter-security treaty was reaffirmed in 1889, but in 1890, William II’s opposition to it (the kaiser thought it dishonourable, since it undermined the promises made to Austria-Hungary concerning the Balkans) allowed it to elapse 3 . Moreover, after the Bulgarian crisis, the Reichsbank had stopped accepting Russian government IOUs as collateral for loans. The measure was supposed to slow down a possible Russian intervention in the Balkans, but it led

France to become Russia’s main loaner, bringing the two countries closer together4. The first treaty was signed in 1891 and followed up by a defensive agreement aimed at Triple Alliance on the 4th of January, 18945.

When it came to the possible extension of Russia’s border, Consiglieri

Pedroso showed himself to be fond of Pan-Slavist union under Russian control, even though, according to him, it shouldn’t go as far as Russian control of the

Straits. Nonetheless, since Slavic peoples (the Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, Slovak, Polabian, Bosnian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Bulgarian, according to the Author’s listing 6 ) shared a cultural and racial connection to Russia, it was sensible to assume that all of them wanted to form a federated state with the empire7.

The formation of said state relied upon two principles: Firstly, the federated countries, before joining the federation, would have had to assimilate

1PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri (dir.), Ibidem.

2Idem, Ibidem.

3MILZA, Pierre, Ibidem, pp.42-43.

4CRAIG, Gordon A., Germany, 1866-1945, Oxford, Claredon Press Oxford, 1999, pp.131-

5BURY, J.P.T, France - 1814-1940, London, Routledge, 2003, pp.145-146.

6PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Vinte dias na Rússia: impressões de uma primeira viagem, Lisbon,

Feitoria dos Livros, 2015, p.141.

7Idem, Ibidem.

136

Russian culture freely1. Consiglieri Pedroso assumed it would be the case, not only because he agreed with the empire’s russification policies2, but because, since all the nations mentioned belonged to the same (Russian) cultural background, he assumed the formation of a federation would be easily accepted. Secondly, Russia had to become a republic before forming the federation3.

It was only if these two paths were followed, Consiglieri Pedroso argued, that Russia could become the benevolent leader of a Pan-Slavic nation without becoming a “domineering influence” 4.

In 1906, the formation of the entente cordiale on the 8th of April 19045, the Franco-Italian rapprochement and the possibility of Anglo-Russian agreement (that came to life on the 31st of August, 19076), convinced Consiglieri

Consiglieri Pedroso that an alliance of the “(…) four Latin nations, England and Russia (…)” formed “(…) a bloc so invincible that all ideas of universal dominion Germany might still have must break before it”7.

He retained his Pan-Slavist ideals up to his death, reiterating his objective of seeing a federal republican Pan-Slavic nation formed in one of the last articles he wrote for the press. On the 6th of July 1908, Consiglieri Pedroso republished part of his travel notes in the newspaper A Lucta. Russia had been defeated by

1Idem, Ibidem, p.150.

2For a more systematic view of empire-building policies in late imperial Russia see BASSIN,

Mark, “Geographies of imperial identity” in LIEVEN, Dominic (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.57-58.

3PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Idem, Ibidem. This assertion was based upon Consiglieri

Pedroso’s concept of Hapiness (for its use on the Author’s travel notes on Russia see: BENVINDA, Frederico, “Arriving in «Arcadia» and meeting Mother Russia: Zófimo Consiglieri Pedroso’s view of Russian urbanity and rurality at the end of the nineteenth century” in SAUTKIN, A. A. (ed.), World City vs. Global Village: Prospects for Dialogue in the Contemporary World, Murmansk, Murmansk Artic State University, 2019, pp.118-130).

His conception of Hapiness was influenced by Charles Lemonnier’s panflet The United States of Europe, first published in Portugal in 1874 by Sebastião de Magalhães Lima. Lemonnier argued the happiness of European nations could only be guaranteed by the formation of a federal republican nation that encompassed all the continent (see LEMONNIER, Charles,

LIMA, Magalhães (trad.), “Os Estados Unidos da Europa” in VIDEIRA, Carrilho (dir.),

Biblioteca Republicana Democrática dedicada ás novas gerações de Portugal e Brasil, Year I, Vol. I, Lisbon, Typographia da Europa, 1874, pp.56-58.)

4PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Manual de Historia Universal, Paris, Guillard, Aillaud e

5MILZA, Pierre, Ibidem, pp.144-145.

6CLARK, Christopher, The Sleepwalkers – How Europe Went to War in 1914, London, Allen Lane (Penguin Books), 2012, p.158.

7PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, “Politica Internacional” in VITOR, Jaime (dir.), Brasil-

Portugal: revista quinzenal illustrada, Year VIII, nº175, Lisbon, Typographia da Companhia

Nacional Editora, 1st of May 1906, p.99.

137

Japan in 1905, leading the Author to leave behind his view of the Russian

Empire as a country with “inexhaustible (…) military resources”, a “potent opponent” to Japan’s expansion, due to her “voracity”1. Nevertheless, although Consiglieri Pedroso believed “the old pan-slavic plan” was no longer able to be achieved, he still believed the Russian border could expand to form the PanSlavic union he had conceived in 1896, now understood also as deterrent to

Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s expansion, particularly in the Balkans2.

Bibliography

Historical sources

1.CAMACHO, Brito (dir.), A Lucta, Year III, nº910, Lisbon, [s.n.], 6th of June 1908, p. 1.

2.Idem, A Lucta, Year III, nº1296, Lisbon, [s.n.], 30th of June 1909, p. 1.

3.Câmara dos Senhores Deputados da Nação Portuguesa, Session n.2, 17th of December, 1884.

4.Câmara dos Senhores Deputados da Nação Portuguesa, Session n.7, 10th of January 1889.

5.Curso Superior de Letras, Livro de matriculas do Curso superior de Letras, Lisbon, Curso Superior de Letras, [s.d.]. Location: PT/AHFLUL/CSL/Cx.05/Cap.06.

6.Idem, Livro do registo dos termos de juramentos dos professores do Curso superior de Letras, Lisbon, Curso Superior de Letras, [s.d.]. Location: PT/AHFLUL/CSL/Cx.05/Cap.02.

7.Ernst Moritz, “Des Deustcher Vaterland”, [s.l.], [s.n.], 1813. [Available online at]: http://www3.ilch.uminho.pt/kultur/Des%20Deutschen%20 Vaterland.htm].

8.LEMONNIER, Charles, LIMA, Magalhães (trad.), “Os Estados Unidos da Europa” in VIDEIRA, Carrilho (dir.), Biblioteca Republicana

Democrática dedicada ás novas gerações de Portugal e Brasil, Year I, Vol. I, Lisbon, Typographia da Europa, 1874.

9.PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri, Compêndio de História Universal (2nd ed.), Porto, Livraria Universal de Magalhães e Moniz, 1885.

10.Idem, “Politica Internacional” in VITOR, Jaime (dir.), Brasil-Portugal:

revista quinzenal illustrada, Year V, nº105, Lisbon, Typographia da

Companhia Nacional Editora, 1st of November 1903, p. 292.

11.Idem, “Politica Internacional” in VITOR, Jaime (dir.), Brasil-Portugal:

revista quinzenal illustrada, Year VIII, nº175, Lisbon, Typographia da Companhia Nacional Editora, 1st of May 1906, p. 99.

1Idem, Ibidem, Year V, nº105, Lisbon, Typographia da Companhia Nacional Editora, 1st of November 1903, p.292.

2CAMACHO, Brito (dir.), A Lucta, Year III, nº910, Lisboa, [s.n.], 6th of June 1908, p.1.

138

12.Idem, Vinte dias na Rússia: impressões de uma primeira viagem, Lisbon, Feitoria dos Livros 2015.

13.Idem, Manual de Historia Universal, Paris, Guillard, Aillaud e Cia., 1884.

14.PEDROSO, Zófimo Consiglieri (dir.), Os Debates, Year II, nº234,

Lisbon, [s.n.], 7th of May 1889, p. 1.

15.Idem, Os Debates, Year II, nº259, Lisbon, [s.n.], 6th of June 1889, p. 2.

16.Idem, Os Debates, Year II, nº270, Lisbon, [s.n.], 20th of June 1889, p. 1.

17.Idem, Os Debates, Year II, nº333, Lisbon, [s.n.], 5th of September 1889, p. 1.

Works cited

1.BASSIN, Mark, “Geographies of imperial identity” in LIEVEN, Dominic

(ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 45-63.

2.BELL, Walter, F., “Russo-Ottoman war, 1877-1878” in HALL, Richard

C. (ed.), War in the Balkans: An Encyclopedic History from the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Breakup of Yugoslavia, Santa Barbara, ABCCLIO, 2014, pp. 252-253.

3.BENVINDA, Frederico, “Arriving in «Arcadia» and meeting Mother Russia: Zófimo Consiglieri Pedroso’s view of Russian urbanity and rurality at the end of the nineteenth century” in SAUTKIN, A. A. (ed.),

World City vs. Global Village: Prospects for Dialogue in the Contemporary World, Murmansk, Murmansk Artic State University, 2019, pp. 118-130.

4.BURY, J.P.T, France - 1814-1940, London, Routledge, 2003.

5.CLARK, Christopher, The Sleepwalkers – How Europe Went to War in 1914, London, Allen Lane (Penguin Books), 2012.

6.CRACRAFT, James, the Revolution of Peter the Great, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003.

7.CRAIG, Gordon A., Germany, 1866-1945, Oxford, Claredon Press Oxford, 1999.

8.DAVIES, Norman, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. I, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005.

9.FIGES, Orlando, Crimean war: A History, New York, Metropolitan Books, 2001.

10.GERD, Lora, Russian Policy in the Orthodox East: The Patriarchate of Constantinople (1878-1914), Berlin, Sciendo (de Gruyter), 2014.

11.GLENNY, Misha, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-2012, Toronto, House of Anansi Press, 2012.

139