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Table 1

The enemies of Russia, % (Russian Public opinion polls, 1994-2017)

Data source: a representative survey of the population of 18 years and older, conducted on 01-05/12/2017. The survey involved 1,600 respondents – residents of 137 urban

and rural settlements in 48 regions of the Russian Federation. Distribution of answers is given as a percentage of the total number of respondents, together with data from previous

surveys. Publication of the Analytical Center of Yuri Levada [3]

Among external enemies can be identified: geopolitical forces (national states and their leaders, international organizations such as NATO, EU); crossborder immigrants (esp. from the former Central Asian republics of the USSR); international terrorism. But in the sphere of foreign policy, the main opposition is one: «The Russian World ↔ the West».

The discourse of the "external enemy" is not the only model of the "Chaos

– Cosmos" confrontation in the modern mythological consciousness. The latent seizure of the country attributed to the "internal enemy" also remains relevant.

Among internal enemies can be identified: power groups (authorities, government, oligarchs); ethnic-confessional groups (Caucasians, Jews, Islamists, ROC); supporters of ideologies (liberals, globalists) seen as agents of foreign influence. The current inner situation is characterized by a lack of social consensus & significant disunity. So the main oppositions are numerous:

«Ordinary people ↔ Authorities», «Center ↔ Periphery», «Russians ↔ Other nationalities», «Resident population ↔ Migrants», «Patriots ↔ Liberal globalists».

Symptoms of authoritarian consciousness (the need for a strong patriarchal leader; post-imperial nostalgia for the disintegrated USSR and the desire to restore a great power) continue to be present in the Russian mass

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consciousness.1 It corresponds to the model of the closed mobilized society of the Soviet type (complexes of isolationism, exclusivity, and opposition to the rest of the world). In fact, this can be viewed as a compensatory reaction that arises among the population as a result of the growing sense of insecurity and feelings of loneliness, which are aggravated by the growing distrust of Russians towards each other. The basis of the current socio-political order in Russia is a combination of hypertrophied hopes for the president with a known distrust of the most important public institutions — the government, the parliament, the media and especially the local authorities, the court, law enforcement agencies, trade unions, political parties.

Table 2

Russia: friends, enemies, the attitude in the world (Russian Public opinion poll, 2018)

What do you think about the attitude towards Russia in the world today – is it good or bad?

Has the attitude towards Russia in the world been improving, worsening or remaining unchanged in recent years?

In your opinion, is Russia respected in the world or not?

1 For more on this, see the results of the study "Political views of Russian society" (2008-2011), conducted by the Laboratory for Political Studies of HSE [4].

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Data source: a representative survey of the population of 18 years and older, conducted on 04/04/2018. The survey involved 1,500 respondents – residents of 104 urban

and rural settlements in 53 regions of the Russian Federation. Publication of the Public Opinion Foundation [9]

Post-Soviet Russia & the West. The correlation of Russia with the West in the post-Soviet period has undergone a definite evolution. The first half of the 90s was characterized by a critical attitude towards the Soviet past, the West was seen as a benchmark and a guideline for development, the American and European experience was being actively adopted, the democracy and liberal tradition were being formed.

From the mid-1990s, the neoconservative wave began, the western standard was refused, Russia's own way and originality were recognized as basic values in a multipolar world. The syndrome of self-depreciation, the perception of Russia as a country defeated in the Cold War and degrading economically and politically, was being overcome.

The current situation, developed after 2000, is characterized by the loss of the attractiveness of the "American and European example" for Russia, the growing anti-Western orientation in politics and public sentiment in the context of increasing US hegemony in the world affairs. The more independent and critical position in relation to the American strategy is taken by a certain country, the warmer the Russians treat this country.

Thus, Post-Soviet Russia's attitude to the West has gone through the following stages: 1) West is a benchmark, Russia is to join the community of civilized nations (first half of the 90s); 2) Western model is inviting, but it does not suit us, Russia has its own way (second half of the 90s); 3) Western world is hostile, Russia first stands in opposition, and then in apparent confrontation (after 2000).

Table 3

Evolution of attitudes towards the West in Post-Soviet Russia

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The stronger and more independent Russia was becoming in international politics, the more tense relations were becoming with the main actors of international politics in the person of the West. At the same time, the perception of the "West" as a generalized "anti-us", alien or hostile to Russia, was becoming more profound. Russia was formed precisely as an antithesis to the "West" – the long-standing notions of Russia’s "borderness", "originality", and

"special path" are actualized again. So, at the present moment (2018), according to respondents, the worst and unfriendly relations are between Russia and the United States (83%), Ukraine (53%), Great Britain (48%), France (24%), Germany (23%), and Canada (10%). The closest friendly relations are with the largest non-Western states of Eurasia: Belarus (59%), China (58%), Kazakhstan (40%), Turkey (26%), and India (21%).1

For Russians, disappointment in various models and options for Russia's entry into international unions is typical.

Table 4

The attractiveness of the unions of Russia with other countries

(Russian Public opinion poll, 2009)

Data source: research materials "The fall of the Berlin Wall: before and after (Russians on the foreign policy process)" (2009), conducted by the Institute of Sociology of

the Russian Academy of Sciences in collaboration with the F. Ebert Foundation in the Russian Federation [7]

1 Data source: Publication of the Public Opinion Foundation [9].

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As the dominant actor of international relations, the West in the public consciousness is represented by various states, military-political, and economic structures: NATO, the USA, Western Europe, the European Union, etc. Europe is regarded as an integral part of the West, both as geopolitical (EU) and cultural-historical subject. Europe as a special cultural and historical formation is closer to Russians than the EU, which, as an institutional subject of international politics, is distrusted.

Russia and the West appear in many respects as civilizational antipodes. In the perception of mass consciousness, objective civilizational differences are reflected primarily in the difference in living conditions and the discrepancy of value priorities.

Table 5

Words associated with Western Europe and Russia, % (Russian Public opinion poll, 2007)

Data source: research materials "On New Russia and Russians: between Europe and Asia", conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in AugustOctober 2007. The quota sampling survey involved 2,000 respondents from 16 to 65 years old

– residents of urban and rural settlements in different regions of the Russian Federation [1]

Some perspectives. In present days, consolidation of the Russian society is mostly based on solidarity in denial and demarcation. The reason for the spread of this type of identification is the "post-totalitarian" state of modern Russian society.

According to Dmitry Trubitsyn, "negative mobilization" can be explained as a countermodernization strategy in the situation of a socio-cultural crisis. It is typical for societies of incomplete modernization, to which modern Russia belongs in a number of parameters (modernization is regarded as following the path indicated by the Western civilization) [10].

As shown by Emil Pain, the social disunity and progressive atomization that developed in the post-Soviet period, along with the traditional tendency to paternalism and the lack of historical experience of self-organization and selfgovernment, create opportune conditions for the reproduction of a special kind of authoritarian political regime in Russia – the patrimonial one (in terms of Max Weber), which manifests itself in societies that are on the path between traditional and rational-legal relations. Within its framework, the rights and duties of representatives of different strata of society are not legitimized by tradition, they do not rely on it. This is a rational relationship generated by fear or profit, but they are not yet legal, not based on the law. The whole system of patrimonial relations is based on the personal (non-legal) dependence of the bureaucracy on the ruler, and of the people on the bureaucracy. The patrimonial model is well suited to explain both the very specifics of political regimes in post-communist countries and the reasons for their sustainability. Patrimonial

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regimes are only a means of the establishment's self-preservation, they are fundamentally not suitable for the implementation of modernization policies. In the system of the global economy, the absence of modernization changes will result in the growing lag of our country in world competition [6].

Modern political propaganda, both in Russia and in the West, creates a special mythological continuum in the social space that has a significant effect on the mass consciousness. Western democracies, despite numerous assurances of adherence to the ideas of freedom of speech and the media, could not avoid deviating toward biased coverage of many world political events. As a result, the "images of the enemy" are also regularly offered a mass audience of Western countries [5]. The real risks of the present and the future are superimposed on traditional stereotypes.

Nevertheless, the modern multipolar world is a complex dynamic of partnership and rivalry, cooperation and confrontation. In such conditions, in addition to the rigid "friend-enemy" dichotomy, arise such relations as "friendly opponents", when today's opponent tomorrow may become a partner on some specific issue, and yesterday's partner may become an opponent on some problem the next day while maintaining the potential for cooperation. The problem of mutual perception in a globally interdependent world is the problem of everyday tactical and strategical relations, and the future of nations and global society essentially depends on how we perceive each other.

Bibliography

1.Андреев А.Л. Образ России в сознании россиян: международные аспекты // Мониторинг общественного мнения: экономические и социальные перемены. 2007. № 4(84). С. 40-52.

2.Враги России. Публикация Аналитического центра Юрия Левады от

3.Гудков Л.Д. Феномен негативной мобилизации // Общественные науки и современность. 2005. № 6. С. 46-57.

4.Касамара В.А., Сорокина А.А. Постсоветская ностальгия в повседневном дискурсе россиян // Общественные науки и современность. 2011. № 6. С. 18-31.

5.Кузьминская С.И. "Образ врага" в современной политической мифологии // Вестник Воронежского государственного университета. Серия: Лингвистика и межкультурная коммуникация. 2016. №3. С. 49-52.

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6.Паин Э.А. О реверсивных процессах в развитии постсоветской России // TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2015. Т. 13. № 3. С. 110-123.

7.Петухов В.В. Внешнеполитические приоритеты массового сознания россиян // Социологические исследования. 2010. № 11. С. 3-13.

8.Попов Н.П. Общественное мнение в России и США о российскоамериканских отношениях // Мониторинг общественного мнения: экономические и социальные перемены. 2015. № 3 (127). С. 53-65.

9.Россия: друзья, враги, отношение в мире. О ценных партнёрах России, близких нам народах и образе нашей страны в мире. Публикация Фонда Общественное мнение от 10 мая 2018 г. [Электронный ресурс] // Фонд Общественное мнение, 2003-2019. – URL: https://fom.ru/Mir/14025 (дата обращения: 12.03.2019).

10.Трубицын Д.В. "Модернизация" и "негативная мобилизация". Конструкты и сущность // Социологические исследования. 2010. № 5. С. 3-13.

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РАЗДЕЛ 3. ПЕРЕОСМЫСЛИВАЯ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩИЕ ГРАНИЦЫ

SECTION 3.

RETHINKING THE BORDERS

78

УДК 167.6+167.7

ББК 26.3

Ю.Л. Войтеховский

ФГБОУ ВО «Санкт-Петербургский горный университет» г. Санкт-Петербург, Россия

ПРИНЦИП ДИССИММЕТРИИ П. КЮРИ: О ГРАНИЦАХ ПРИМЕНИМОСТИ ПРИНЦИПА О ПОГРАНИЧНЫХ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯХ

Аннотация. Дана формулировка принципа диссимметрии П. Кюри, хорошо известного в естественных науках. Высказана идея, что принцип имеет более глубокое методологическое значение и приложим к гораздо более широкому кругу феноменов.

Ключевые слова: принцип диссимметрии П. Кюри, естественные науки, методология, явление, среда, граница.

Yu.L. Voytekhovsky

Saint-Petersburg Mining University

Saint-Petersburg, Russia

THE P. CURIE DISSYMMETRY PRINCIPLE: ON THE BORDERS OF APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE ON BORDER INTERACTIONS

Abstract. The formulation of the P. Curie dissymmetry principle, well known in the natural sciences, is given. The idea is expressed that the principle has a deeper methodological significance and is applicable to a much wider range of phenomena.

Key words: the P. Curie dissymmetry principle, natural sciences, methodology, phenomenon, environment, boundary.

С одной стороны – шёпот из глубины нашего нутра, с другой – плотоядное томление пустоты…

Алехандро Ходоровский (2005)

Ещё до того, как прославить своё имя работами по радиоактивности, будущий нобелевский лауреат П. Кюри на основании результатов экспериментов по выращиванию кристаллов под действием различных физических полей сформулировал несколько согласованных положений, в совокупности выражающих принцип, сегодня известный как принцип диссимметрии (Curie, 1894, Кюри, 1966). По ходу исследований П. Кюри ввёл в науку представление о предельных (с осями бесконечного порядка) группах симметрии и показал, что все возможные физические среды исчерпываются семью (с учётом энантиоморфизма десятью) предельными