In its nature beyond the scope of it.

Holme v. Hammond (1872), L. K 7 Ex. 218; here it

was held that, whenever a contract of partnership existed

between commercial men, each partner was in contempla-

tion of law the agent for each of the others, and for the

firm collectively; and tliat the other partners were bound

\>y any contract which one of them might enter into within

the scoi)e of the partncrshi}) with reference to the nature

AUTEOBITY OF AGENTS. 37

of the undertaking ; this agency being an incident of the

contract of co-partnership.

SoKcitors, Estate Agents, Ship-masters, and Ship-

husbands are also mercantile agents, who are severally-

invested by construction of law w^ith certain implied

authority.

38 THE LAW OF AQENQY.

CHAPTER III.

RIGHTS OF A PRINCIPAL AGAINST HIS AGENT.

1. A remunerated agent is bound to do the work which

he has undertaken for his principal ; and is bound to do it

with reasonable care, diligence, and skill. The agent is

bound to indemnify his principal for any loss or damage

which the principal may sustain by reason of the agent's

negligence, or other breach of his duty as an agent. And

in an action by a principal against his agent for negligence

or other breach of duty, the measure of damages is the

actual loss sustained by the principal as the natural and

probable consequence of such negligence or breach of duty.

Cassahoglou v. Gihhs (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 797. C. A.; here a

commission agent at Hong Kong was employed to buy a

particular kind of opium by a principal in England.

Instead of informing his principal that it could not be

procured, he negligently purchased and shipped to him

oj)ium which he by mistake thought was such as his

])rincipal had ordered. In an action brought by the

principal, the Court of Appeal held that the proper measure

of damages was the actual loss sustained by the principal

in consequence of the opium not being of the description

oi-dercd, and not the difference between the value of the

<lescription ordered and of that shipped.

A voluntary or gi-atuitous agent is only liable for neg-

ligence in cairying out a work which he has actually

RIQETS OF A PBINCIPAL AGAINST HIS AGENT. 39

commenced ; but he is not bound to enter upon the agency

at all, unless he chooses; for when tliere is no considera-

tion for the agent's promise, there cannot be any binding

contract of agency ; and though he is liable for any mis-

feasance in the course of his employment, he cannot be

made liable for a mere nonfeasance. If, however, a

Voluntary agent does enter upon the agency work, he is

bound to carry it out with reasonable care, diligence, and

skill; it having been decided that the confidence induced

by undertaking a service for another is a sufficient con-

sideration to create a duty in the performance of it. But

a gratuitous agent is not bound to show the same amount

of care, diligence, and skill as a paid agent ; for while the

latter is liable for ordinary or simple negligence, the

gratuitous agent is only liable for gross negligence.

For the above rules, vide the following cases : —

Elsee V. Gativard (1793), 5 T. R. 143 ; here it was held

that if a party voluntarily undertakes to perform work

and proceeds on the employment, he makes himself liable

for any misfeasance in the course of that work ; but if he

undertakes, but does not proceed with the work, no action

will lie against him for the nonfeasance,

Balfe V. West (1853), 13 C. B. 466; here it was held

that the steward of a horse-race who had not entered upon

the duties of his office could not be liable for mere non-

feasance in omitting to appoint a judge to determine the

winner.

Cogys V. Bernard (1704), 1 Sm. L. C. 10th ed., 167;

here the defendant had undertaken, without any remunera-

tion, to take up several hogsheads of brandy from a certain

cellar, and to lay them down safely in another cellar. In

the transfer, by the gross negligence of the defendant and

his servants, one of the casks got staved in, and a great

deal of brandy was lost. The Court held that although

the defendant was a gratuitous bailee, he was liable for the

damage, on the ground that the confidence induced by