Ing that he had given such an authority, and the result as

to them was the same as if he had really given it."

Upon the principle laid down in the above cases,

If a master has held out his servant as his agent, by

FORMATION OF AGENCY. 3

habitually allowing him to pledge his credit with a trades-

man, the servant is held to be his master's agent for

that purpose ; and the master will be liable upon his

contracts until the tradesman has received notice of the

termination of the authority : e.g. if a master habitually

pays for oats bought for his horse by his groom, the latter

would be held to be his general agent for the purpose of

buying a reasonable quantity of oats ; but not for the

purpose of buying anything else. On the same principle,

If a husband has habitually allowed his wife to pledge his

credit with a tradesman, he will be liable upon her contracts

until the tradesman has received notice of the termination

of the authority— mcZe Dreiu v. Nunn (1879), 4 Q. B. D. 661-

C.A., and Debenham v. Mellon (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 403,

& 6 App. Gas. 24.

But a wife has no inherent authority qua wife to

pledge her husband's credit, even for necessaries; and

where she does bind him she does so merely as his agent—

Vide Eastland V. Burchell (1878), 8 q. B. D. 436, and

Debenham v. Mellon, iibi supra. In the latter case it was

held that a husband who was willing and able to supply

his wife with necessaries, and who had forbidden her to

pledge his credit, was not liable to a tradesman who,

having had no previous dealings with the wife with the

husband's consent, had supplied her with necessary articles

of dress, even though the tradesman had received no notice

of the husband's prohibition.

5. His appointment may be implied in law from

necessity, in certain cases ; in this kind of agency the

relation of principal and agent is implied by construction

of law, although no such relation actually exists in fact.

We find in Story on Agency (9th ed., sect. 142) the fol-

lowing statement : " The same doctrine {i.e. of necessity)

would seem to apply to the case of a mere stranger

6 The law of agency.

acting for the principal, without any authority, under

circumstances of positive necessity ; as for example in the

case of a stranger interfering to prevent irreparable injury

to perishable property occasioned by fire, shipwreck, in-

undation, or other casualties." It seems, however, clear,

from the following cases, that, in English Law, the doctrine

of agency from necessity can only arise in certain well-

known and exceptional cases.

Nicholson V. GJuipman (1793), 2. H. Bl. 254, & 3 R.R.

374 ; Here it was held that the doctrine of authority by

reason of necessity is confined to certain well-known ex-

ceptional cases, such as the master of a ship, or the

acceptor of a bill of exchange who accepts to save the

drawer's honour.

Haivtayne v. Bourne (1841), 7. M. & W. 595, & 5 Jur.