V. Knatchhidl (1787), 2 t. R. 148; in these two cases it

was decided that a sheriff, though liable civilly, is not

liable criminally for the acts of his officers.

Of course if a principal expressly orders another to do

a criminal act, then the principal is criminally responsible

for that act. Where, however, a principal employs another

to do something which can Ijc done either in a criminal

or in an innocent inaiine]', and that other docs it in a

criminal manner, then tlie principal is not responsible.

There are, however, many cases where, by reason of

the provisions of some statute, or from the peculiar nature

of the offence, a principal is held criminally liable for the

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF DRINGIPAL AND AGENT. 127

acts of his agent, though done without his express or

Implied authority, or even though done against his express

orders.

Sherras v. de Butzen (1895), 1 Q. B. 918 ; here Wright,

J., said ; " There is a presumption that " Mens rea" an

evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the

act, is an essential ingredient in every offence ; but the

presumption is liable to be displaced, either by the words

of the statute creating the offence, or by the subject-

matter with which it deals, and both must be considered."

Liability of a Principal for the Breach of Penal Statutes

by his Agent. — Revenue Acts. — Attorney-General v. Slddon

(1830), 1 Cr. & J. 220 ; here a trader had concealed smuggled

tobacco in a cellar. When the tobacco was discovered, his

servant procured a permit with the intention of protecting

the tobacco from seizure. It was held that the master

was liable in penalties for the illegal act of his servant,

though he was absent at the time, and though the act

was done upon the exigency of the moment ; seeing that

It was done by the servant in the conduct of his master's

business, and for his benefit. In giving judgment, Bayley,

B., said ; " In the first place I consider this as being not

properly a criminal proceeding, but a civil proceeding for

the purpose of recovering that which is a debt of the

Crown. It is a penal proceeding. . . . But whatever the

nature of this proceeding is, whether penal or merely

civil, this is a case in which, to my mind, the act of the

servant is to be considered as being an act done in the

master's business, and within the scope of the authority

probably given by the master to the servant. ... I am of

opinion that in this case there was prima facie evidence

to show that the act of the servant was the act of the

master. The master was certainly at liberty to have pro-

duced evidence for the purpose of rebutting that i^rimd

facie case ; but in the absence of any evidence to rebut

that case, I am of opinion that it was rightly left to the

128 TEE LAW OF AGENCY.

jury ; and that the jury were bound to consider it as being

the master's act, and that consequently the verdict on the

seventh count is right."

B. V. Dean (1843), 12 M. & W. 39; 3 & 4 Will. IV.

c. 53, s. 44, enacts, that every person who is concerned

in the unshipping of goods, the duties for which have not

been paid, etc., shall forfeit either the treble value thereof,

or be liable to a penalty of ВЈ100. In this case it was held

that each partner of a firm whose clerk had been guilty

of a fraud, by removing some of the leaves of the Custom

House book, and substituting others containing false entries

of the quantity of goods imported, was liable to the penalty

incurred through the act of their clerk ; seeing that they

derived a benefit from his fraud, and produced no evidence

to rebut the -priinct facie presumption, which arose from

that circumstance, that they were privy to his act.

■ Licensing Acts. — Mullins v. Collins (1874), L. K. 9 Q. B.

292 ; section 16 of 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94 (The Licensing Act

of 1872), makes it an offence for any licensed person to

supply any liquor or refreshment, either by way of gift

or sale, to a police constable on duty, without the authority

of his superior officer. In this case the servant of a licensed

victualler knowingly supplied liquor to a constable on duty

without the authority of his superior officer. It was held

that the licensed victualler was liable under the above

section, though he had no actual knowledge of his servant's

act. It seems probable, if we compare this case with the

two following ones, that, although it was not proved here

that the master had delegated his autliority to the servant,

nevertheless the presumption that such delegation had in

fact taken place in the ordinary coui'se of business, formed

part of the grounds of the Court's decision — vide Foster's

Law of Licensing, p. 124.

Somerset v. TTart (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 360; section 17 of