Interest, such an authority is not revocable by the principal.

An authority coupled with an interest may be defined as,

"An authority given upon good consideration for the })urpose

of securing some benefit to the donee of tlie authority."

JVilJdnso7i V. Wilkinson (1818), ',] Swanst. 527 ; here a

person gave a power of attorney to a creditor authorizing

him to receive certain rents in payment of the debts owing

to him. The Court held that this was an authority coupled

w itli an interest and was irrevocable.

DETERMINATION OF AGENCY. 141

Gausmi v. Morton (1830), 10 B. & C. 731; here a

power of attorney was given to a creditor to sell certain

lands of his debtor, and to apply the proceeds in payment

of a debt due to himself and partners. It was held that

this was an authority coupled with an interest and was

Irrevocable.

Smart v.Sandars (1848),5 C.B. 895; here goodswere con-

signed for sale to a factor, who subsequently made advances

to his principal. The principal at request having neglected to

repay such advances, the factor sold the goods contrary to

his principal's orders. It was held that the factor's authority

was not one coupled with an interest, and that he had no

right to have sold the goods. Wilde, C.J., in delivering

judgment, said; " It appears to be that where an agreement

Is entered into on a sufficient consideration, whereby an

authority is given for the purpose of conferring some benefit

on the donee of that authority, such an authority is irrevo-

cable. That is what is meant l^y an authority coupled with

an interest, and which is commonly said to be irrevocable

We think this doctrine only applies to cases where the

authority in given for the purpose of being a security, or,

as Lord Kenyon expresses it, as a part of the security, not to

cases where the authority is given independently, and the

interest of the donee of the authority arises afterwards and

incidentally only. . . . The making of such an advance (by

a factor) may be a good consideration for an agreement that

the authority shall be no longer revocable, but such an

effect will not, we think, arise independently of agreement."

ClerJc V. Laurie (1857), 2 H. & N. 199 ; here Williams, J.,

said ; " What is meant by an authority coupled with an

interest being irrevocable is this — that where an agreement

is entered into on a sufficient consideration, whereby an

authority is given for the purpose of securing some benefit

to the donee of the authority, such authority is irrevocable."

Bead v. Anderso7i (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 100 ; here the plain-

tiff, a turf commission agent and a member of Tattersall's,

142 The law of agency.

was employed to make a bet for the defendant. After the

bet had been made and lost, the defendant ordered plaintiff

not to pay the bet ; but the plaintiff did pay it, to avoid

being posted as a defaulter at Tattersall's, and sued the

defendant for the amount. Hawkins, J., held that the

plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant, on

the ground that the liability to be posted as a defaulter at

Tattersall's was an "interest," and made the plaintiti"s

authority irrevocable.

Hawkins, J.'s decision was affirmed in the Court of

Appeal, but upon another ground {vide p. 67, ante). And it

seems very improbable that the wide interpretation of an

authority coupled with an interest, given by Hawkins, J.^

would be upheld by the Courts. And, at all events, by force

of the Gaming Act of 1892 (55 Vict. c. 9), the principle could

not now apply to a betting contract.