In law to no consideration at all."

Bridger v. Savage (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 363; here the

defendant, who was a commission agent, made a horse-

racing bet on behalf of his principal, the plaintiff; the

defendant won the bet, and received the money, but re-

fused to hand it over to his principal ; who therefore brought

this action to recover it. The Court held that the original

betting contract was merely void under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109,

s. 18, and not illegal ; and that therefore the plaintiff'

was entitled to recover the money which had been paid

to the defendant, as being money had and received to the

plaintiff's use.

Bead v. Anderson (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 100 ; here Haw-

kins, J., said ; " The object of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, was not

to render illegal wagers which up to that time had been

lawful, but simply to make the law no longer available

for their enforcement, leaving the parties to them to pay

them or not, as their sense of honour might dictate."

SLrachan v. Universal Stock Excliange (1895), 12 T. L. R.

38 ; Here Smith, l. J., said ; " As was well pointed out by

Justice Lusli in JIaigh v. Totun (Juuncil of Sheffield (1874*),

RIGHTS OF AN AGENT AGAINST HIS PRINCIPAL. G7

L. R. 10 Q. B. 102, a wager is made by statute a thing of

a neutral character. It is not forbidden; it leaves an

ordinary betting debt a mere debt of honour, depriving

It of all legal obligation, but not making it illegal."

(b) Seeing that it merely renders wagering contracts

Void and unenforceable, it does not take away an agent's

right to be indemnified for any loss or damage he may

have incurred in carrying out a wagering contract.

Bead v. Anderson (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 779 ; in this case

the plaintiff, a turf commission agent and a member of

Tattersall's, was employed by the defendant to make a bet

on a horse-race for him. After the bet had been made and

lost, the defendant ordered the plaintiff not to pay it ; the

plaintiff, however, did pay it in order to avoid being posted

as a defaulter at Tattersall's, and sued the defendant for

the amount he had paid. The Court of Appeal (affirm-

Ing the judgment of Hawkins, j. (1882), 10 q. B. 100)

held that the plaintifi' was entitled to recover, on the

ground that the principal had impliedly bargained not to

revoke the authority to pay, but to indemnify the agent

for acting in the ordinary course of his business. Though

a betting contract was void and could not be legally en-

forced, by a usage of the plaintiff's business known to both

parties at the time the contract of employment was made

the plaintiff became morally obliged to pay the bet.

Bo wen, L.J., in delivering judgment, said; "It seems to

me that it was well understood to be part of the bargain

that the principal should recoup his agent, and should not

revoke the authority to pay, but should indemnify the

agent against all payments made in the regular course of

business. I feel the force of the point that the obligation

to pay a lost bet is not recognized by law ; but the plaintiff

has placed himself in a position of pecuniary difficulty at

the defendant's request, who impliedly contracted, I think,

to indemnify him from the consequences which would ensue