It was held that the above evidence was rightly admitted ;

for it must be taken that the station-master, being the

])erson in chai-ge there, had authority from the defendants

to set tlie p(jlice in motion, and that what he said pertinent

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. 125

to the occasion, when acting within the scope of his

authority, was evidence against the defendants.

Garth v. Howard (1832), 1 M. & Scott. 628, & 8 Bing.

451 ; Here it was held that statements made by the

shopman of a pawnbroker, who is left in the shop to

answer questions in his master's absence, can only be

received in an action against the master when they relate

to transactions which are strictly within the business of

a pawnbroker ; and are not receivable if they relate to an

advance of money not within the Pawnbrokers Act, 39 &

40 Geo. III. c. 99.

Great Western Railway Company v. Willis (1865), 18

C. B. N.S. 748 ; here, in an action in the County Court

against the railway company for not conveying cattle to

market within a reasonable time, evidence was given of a

conversation which took place a week after the alleged

cause of action arose, between the plaintiff and a night

Inspector at one of the company's stations, whose duty it

was to forward the cattle. In the conversation the latter,

In answer to a question as to why he did not send the

cattle on, stated that " he had forgotten them," It was

held that such evidence was wrongly admitted, as it was

not within the scope of the man's authority to make

admissions as to bygone transactions,

2. Where a principal expressly refers another to a

third person for information upon a particular matter, that

third person becomes the agent of the principal for that

particular purpose, and any admissions or declarations

made by him concerning the matter in question are evidence

against the principal,

- Hood V, Beeve (1828), 3 C. & P. 532; here it was

held that if a person, on being applied to on a particular

matter, writes an answer, mentioning another person, and

saying on one occasion, " He is in possession of my senti-

ments, and will attend ; " and on another, " I have written

126 Tee law of agency.

to him, and I refer you to him thereon ; " such letters are

sufficient to constitute the party referred to an agent in

the business : and what he said at a meeting on the subject

may be given in evidence against the principal.

Liability of Principal to Third Party for his Agent's

Crimes. — As a general rule a principal cannot be made

criminally liable for the criminal acts of his agent, unless

those acts are done with his express or implied authority.

For it is a well-established maxim of law that criminal

responsibility can only attach to a man when it can be

shown that the act with which he is charged was done

with a criminal intent on his part — " Actus non facit reum,

nisi mens sit rea."

B. V. Huggins (1731), 2 Str. 882; here Raymond, C.J.,

said ; " It is a point not to be disputed, but that in criminal

•cases the principal is not answerable for the act of the

deputy, as he is in civil cases ; they must each answer

for their own acts, and stand or fall by their own be-

haviour. All the authors that treat of criminal proceedings

proceed on the foundation of this distinction ; that to affect

the superior by the act of the deputy, there must be the

command of the superior, which is not found in this case."

Sanderson v. Baher (1772), 3 Wils. 309, and Woodgate