10 The law of agency.

L. R. 4 P. C. 222 ; here it was held that a ship-master may, in

a case of necessity, in the absence of the owner, sell the cargo

In the owner's interests : and it was laid down by the Court,

that when an emergency casts upon a man the duty of

taking some action for another, and he under that obliga-

tion takes the course which, to the judgment of a wise and

prudent man, is apparently the best for the interest of that

other person, it may properly be said of the course so taken,

that it was, in a mercantile sense, necessary to take it.

A common carrier by land has, in a case of necessity,

an authority to pledge the owner's credit for the purpose of

taking reasonable care of his goods — vide Great Northern

Maihuay Company v. Siuaffield (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 132.

G. He may be appointed by subse(]ueat ratification.

Wilson V. Tumman (1843), 6 M. & G. 236, & 6 Scott.

N. R. 894 ; here Tindal, C.J., delivering the judgment of the

Court, said ; " That an act done for another by a person not

assuming to act for himself, but for such other person, though

without any precedent authority whatever, becomes the act

of the principal, if subsequently ratified by him, is the known

and well-established rule of law. In that case the principal

Is bound by the act, whether it be for his detriment or his

advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or a con-

tract, to the same extent as by, and with all the conse-

quences which follow from the same act done by his

previous authority."

Bird V. Broivn (1850), 4 Ex. 780, & 14 Jur. 132; here

It was laid down by the Court, that the maxhn " Omnis

ratihabitio retro trahitur ct mandato jcquiparatur " meant ;

firstly, as regards contracts, that if A unauthorized by B

made a contract with C on his behalf, which B after-

wards adopted and ratified, tlie contract would be dealt

witli as if having been made in the first instance with

h is authority; secondly, as regards torts, that if A

FORMATION OF AGENCY. 11

professing to act by B's authority did that which jprimd

facie amounted to a trespass, and B afterwards adopted and

ratified his act, A would be treated as having from the

beginning acted by his authority, and B would become a

trespasser, unless he could justify the act.

But in order to constitute a vahd and binding ratifica-

tion, the following conditions must exist : —

{a) When an unauthorized agent does an act, which

Is to be subsequently ratified by another, he must, at the

time that he does the act, have the intention of doing it on

behalf of the principal who subsequently ratifies. But pro-

Vided he has this intention in his mind, he need not at the

time that he does the act profess to be acting on behalf

•of a principal, but may do the act in his own name.

Durant cO Conqm^ny v. Bohevts tC- Keighhy, Maxsted <f-

Company (1900), 1 Q. B. G29. C. A.; in this case the

defendant Roberts having been authorized by Keighley,

Maxsted & Company, to purchase, on joint account of

himself and them, certain quantities of wheat at certain

prices, and having been unable to effect the purchases at

the prices in question, without authority from Keighley,

Maxsted & Company, bought the wheats from the plain-

tiffs at higher prices. The contracts in the contract notes

purported to be made between plaintiffs and Roberts only,

and it appeared that the latter, when making the contracts,

did not mention any principal at all. Roberts having

subsequently informed Keighley, Maxsted & Company's

manager of the purchases, he said that he thought the

wheats were worth the prices given, and told Roberts to

take them. The plaintiffs having brought an action for

non-acceptance of wheat sold by the plaintiffs to the defend-

ants, verdict and judgment were entered for the defend-

ants ; and thereupon the plaintiffs applied to the Court of

Appeal for a new trial.

At the hearing of the appeal it was contended for the